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ABSTRACT
MEHRDAD SAMADI: Intermarket Competition: Evidence from Short Sales.
(Under the direction of Adam V. Reed and Eric Ghysels)
Using a novel collection of off-exchange trade data, I study where short sellers exploit their
well-documented information advantage. I find that short sales comprise a greater proportion
of exchange trading than dark pool trading. I find stronger evidence of return predictability for
exchange short sales than for dark pool short sales. In periods leading up to unscheduled negative
corporate news releases, I find evidence of increased exchange short sales. I find evidence of
increased exchange short sale return predictability prior to news releases. My results indicate that
dark pools host a different composition of trade than exchanges.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Theory suggests that as trading fragments across competing mechanisms, both the ability to
trade in individual markets and the ability of trading to aggregate information can be affected
(see Pagano, 1989 and Biais, Martimort, and Rochet, 2000; among others). These effects can be
exacerbated if markets compete for certain types of trade. Providing an efficient price and liquidity
are fundamental functions of financial markets in their broader roles of facilitating risk sharing and
the efficient allocation of capital (see Fama, 1970; and O’Hara, 1999; among others). The rise
of dark pools, which offer potentially lower transaction costs and a lower probability of trade than
stock exchanges has contributed substantially to the increased fragmentation of U.S. equity trading.
Formerly a small and obscure set of trading venues, dark pools are now hosting approximately 17%
of trading volume while a stock can trade in over 40 venues.1
In this paper, I empirically study where the informed trade in the U.S. equity market in order
to study the theory of intermarket competition. Informed traders in this class of models trade in a
way that maximizes the value of their information (as in Kyle, 1985 and other models of strategic
trade) while facing a tradeoff between potentially incurring lower transaction costs in a dark pool
and having a higher probability of trade on exchange (see Hendershott and Mendelson, 2000; Ye,
2011; and Zhu, 2014; among others). This line of theory suggests that where informed traders
trade in aggregate affects both price efficiency and exchange liquidity.
An empirical challenge in this institutional setting is that methods commonly used to identify
informed trade cannot be well-applied. For example, the Hasbrouck (1995) information share
examines the lead/lag relationship between venue trade or quote prices, but dark pools do not
publically display orders and trades are executed at exchange quoted prices by design. The Easley,
1See, “Dark Pools Confront More Transparent Future Amid Threats”, Bloomberg, 9/17/2014.
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Kiefer, O’Hara, and Paperman (1996) probability of informed trading which relies on identifying
the initiating side of a trade is also difficult to apply in this setting.2 In addition, data comprehensively
identifying dark pool trading in U.S. equities has not been readily available. I use a novel collection
of identified dark pool trade-level data, a database of corporate news releases, and short sale
trade-level data for a time-honored notion of informed trade. I examine where short sellers exploit
their well-documented information advantage.
Non-exchange trading venues otherwise known as dark pools offer potentially lower transaction
costs than exchanges. Dark pools do not publicly display orders and often match orders at prices
inside the exchanges’ prevailing best bid and ask (National Best Bid and Offer, or the NBBO).3
However, dark pool orders are less likely to be filled relative to exchange orders. Dark pools
are often characterized by the fact that they only “passively” cross the orders of buyers and
sellers prices at and within the NBBO by rule. Dark pools “passively” cross orders because the
NBBO is determined at traditional stock exchanges whose quotes are both publically displayed and
contribute to the construction of the NBBO.4 In contrast to exchanges, if there is not contra-side
interest in a dark pool for an order at prices at and within the NBBO, trade will not take place.5 Dark
pools are separate venues and not fully integrated with stock exchanges. Consequently, dark pool
order flow may never enter the traditional stock exchanges where reference prices are determined.
2With current cross-market clock synchronicity standards, it is difficult correctly identify the exact timing and sequence
of off-exchange transactions and many dark pool trades take place at the midpoint of the National Best Bid and Offer,
so price tests cannot be well-applied.
3Off-exchange trades are reported to public data feeds after execution with a delay. With that said, the absence of
pre-trade transparency in itself may change the nature of the public information set relative to the case where all
trades and orders are hosted on “lit” markets (for example, see the experimental studies of Flood, Huisman, Koedjik,
and Maheiu, 1999; Bloomfield, O’Hara, and Saar, 2015; and Madhavan, 2000 for empirical results). However, it
is important to emphasize that the notion and nature of segmentation of trade are the main focus of this paper. The
presence of dark pools in U.S. market structure has different implications than the presence of “hidden” orders on
exchanges. In the case of hidden exchange orders, other types of exchange order flow can still trade against hidden
order flow, unlike dark pool order flow. I also abstract from competition amongst similar mechanisms as a stock can
currently trade in over 10 exchanges and 30 dark pools.
4An exception to this is Lava Flow ECN, which for some time provided quotes through the FINRA Alternative Display
Facility (ADF).
5Marketable order imbalances on exchanges will result in trading at a new price level and a change in the NBBO.
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In this paper, I ask three questions. Where do the informed trade? Where are short sales most
informed? Where do the informed trade when information is short lived? When examining where
the informed trade, I find that short sales comprise 45.7% of a stock’s exchange trading volume
and 37.0% of a stock’s dark pool trading volume on average, respectively. When examining
where short sales are most informed, I find that stocks which are heavily shorted in dark pools
and on exchanges underperform corresponding lightly shorted stocks by a four-factor adjusted
value-weighted average of 0.53% and 0.89% over the following 20 trading days (6.41% and
10.70% annualized), respectively. At higher frequency, midquote excess returns after exchange
short sales are 0.32, 0.83, and 1.50 basis points (3.78% annualized) lower than corresponding
post-dark pool short sale returns over post-trade horizons of 30 minutes, two hours, and one trading
day, respectively. In order to understand where the informed trade when information is short-lived,
I study trading surrounding a sample of corporate news events. Since the arrival date of scheduled
news known to the public in advance, uninformed traders may lower exposures to avoid adverse
selection (as in Glosten and Milgrom, 1985) and pre-announcement trading may be reflective of
belief heterogeneity (see Lee, Mucklow, and Ready, 1993; Sarkar and Schwartz, 2009; and Baruch,
Panayides, and Venkataraman, 2015). However, uninformed traders likely do not know when
unscheduled news will arrive and research has found pre-announcement trading to be reflective of
asymmetric information. When I separate corporate news releases into scheduled and unscheduled
events, I find that dark pools only capture an increased proportion of trading when the arrival
of news is scheduled. Furthermore, I find relatively stronger evidence of increased exchange short
selling on the trading day prior to unscheduled negative news arrival. In my sample of news events,
I also only find evidence of increased 20-day cross-sectional return predictability of exchange short
sellers on the trading day prior to news releases. In contrast to Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg
(2012), I do not find evidence of increased 20 day cross-sectional return predictability of short
sellers in dark pools or on exchanges on news release days.
In the spirit of Myers and Majluf (1984), Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) formalizes a
“pecking-order hypothesis” of trading venues including Exchanges, Midpoint Dark Pools, and
3
Non-Midpoint Dark Pools. I further disaggregate the dark pools in the sample into dark pools
characterized by large trade sizes (Block Dark Pools), dark pools characterized by smaller trade
sizes than Block Dark Pools and a large percentage of trades occurring inside the NBBO (Midpoint
Dark Pools), and dark pools characterized by smaller trade sizes than Block Dark Pools and a
relatively small percentage of trades occurring inside the NBBO (Non-Midpoint Dark Pools). I
find that short sales comprise 15.35%, 42.82%, and 48.37% of Block Dark Pools, Midpoint Dark
Pools, and Non-Midpoint Dark Pools trading volume, respectively. I find the strongest evidence
of short sale cross-sectional daily return predictability of the dark pools I study in Non-Midpoint
Dark Pools, then Midpoint Dark Pools, then Block Dark Pools. At higher frequency, Midpoint
Dark Pools exhibit the least intraday post-short sale return predictability.
There are several contributions of my results. They provide an understanding of how information
is incorporated into equity prices in markets where a stock can trade in over 40 venues with
different mechanisms. More specifically, while a number of recent studies have examined which
short sellers are informed and how short sellers obtain their information advantage, my results
provide insight into where short sellers exploit their information advantage. There has also been
research that has debated whether news resolves asymmetric information or creates it; my results
provide evidence that in today’s high frequency markets, asymmetric information is resolved faster
for the sample of news releases I study. I provide new support for the theory of intermarket
competition which complement empirical papers on dark pools and fragmentation which focus
on empirical measures of liquidity and arrive to mixed results (see Buti, Rindi, and Werner, 2011
and Weaver, 2014; among others). To the extent that the sample of dark pools examined in this
paper and short sellers are representative, my results suggest that dark pools as a group induce
segmentation of trade. Theory suggests that as relatively more informed trade is executed on
exchanges and relatively more uninformed trade is executed in dark pools, there will be less
noise accompanying informed order flow on exchanges. My results also may suggest that the
off-exchange venues that may stand to lose the most market share from the implementation of a
4
trade-at rule also appear to be inducing the least segmentation of the dark pools I study.6
The balance of this paper proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature, Chapter
3 discusses the collection of data employed in this study, empirical methodology, and results.
Chapter 4 concludes.
6The Lucas critique aside.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE
2.1 Where the Informed Trade
A number of studies examine where informed traders trade in equity markets, debt markets, and
their respective contingent claims. This literature helps us understand how information becomes
incorporated into asset prices, an issue of longstanding interest to both the efficient markets and
rational expectations literatures. Stephan and Whaley (1990), Mayhew, Sarin, and Shastri (1995),
Easley, O’Hara, and Srinivas (1998), Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004), and Pan and
Poteshman (2006), among others examine trading in equities and equity options and results are
mixed with regard to where the informed trade. Hasbrouck (2003) examines trading in U.S.
equity index markets and finds that E-mini S&P 500 futures contribute the most to intraday price
discovery of the markets examined. Acharya and Johnson (2007) examines trading in credit default
swaps in relation to equities and finds evidence of informed trading in credit default swaps. My
study provides a more nuanced understanding of how information enters the U.S. equity market by
examining the trading and return predictability of short sellers on exchanges and in dark pools.
2.2 Fragmentation and Pre-Trade Transparency
Fragmentation and pre-trade transparency are two relevant issues when considering dark pools.
While there has been a shift towards more transparency in financial markets, the recent growth of
dark pools which do not publically display orders in the U.S. equity market is an exception to this
trend. Milgrom and Weber (1982) analyzes the setting of a common value auction and shows that
bid transparency increases competition. Baruch (2005) shows that making the limit order book
transparent also increases competition. With regard to fragmentation, Pagano (1989) analyzes
fragmentation across two markets in an endowment economy and shows that traders are attracted
to venues where others trade. For more on fragmentation and pre-trade transparency, see Madhavan
(2000) and Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015), inter alia.
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2.3 Intermarket Competition
In theory of intermarket competition, informed traders choose where to trade in order to maximize
the value of their information. Ye (2011) and Zhu (2014) both model the coexistence of a “dark
pool” (more generally a passive crossing platform) alongside a “lit” venue. In these models, traders
weigh a tradeoff between the potential of not obtaining a trade execution in the dark pool against
incurring higher transaction costs on exchange. Ye (2011) extends the Kyle (1985) framework in
order to examine the choice of venue of a monopolistic informed trader and finds that the informed
trader will choose to split his order between the dark pool and exchange, trading less aggressively
on the exchange and revealing less of his information relative to Kyle (1985). Consequently, the
presence of dark pools will reduce market volatility and price discovery. Zhu (2014) presents a
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) - like model which allows both infinitesimal informed traders and
liquidity traders to choose their trading venue.1 Since informed traders are more likely to have
correlated orders and cluster on the heavy side of the market, they suffer from increased execution
risk relative to liquidity traders. Consequently, relatively more informed traders will choose to
trade on exchange while relatively more liquidity traders will choose to trade in the dark pool.
With less noise accompanying informed demand and supply on the exchange, exchange prices will
become more informative, though this coincides with less exchange liquidity.2
Furthermore, Zhu (2014) and Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) examines the coexistence of
different types of trading venues and the notion of “information horizon”, by examining the case
1The assumption of traders self-selecting which trading venue to use has recently been called into question. Brokers
often execute trades on behalf of clients and have discretion on how to submit orders. This is trivial if the incentives of
the broker and customer are aligned; however, O’Donoghue (2015) analyzes delegated order routing in the presence
of payments for order flow and finds that the delegation of order routing is non-trivial. Battalio, Corwin, and Jennings
(2015) empirically finds that several retail brokerages route order flow in a manner that appears to maximize order
flow payments, which may result in worse execution quality for their customers. Barclays has also been accused of
routing a disproportionate amount of their smart order router order flow to their dark pool, LX, in order to build its
market share of trading volume. This may suggest that similar issues may exist for institutional order routing. See,
“Five Questions on the Barclays Dark Pool Lawsuit”, Wall Street Journal, 6/26/2014. These issues suggest that not
only do customers often delegate the choice of trading venue to their brokers, but that the incentives of the broker and
customer may not be aligned. While I attempt to explain motivations of traders, theory suggests that the equilibrium
outcome of where order flow gets executed in the aggregate still has implications for market quality and efficiency
regardless of motivation.
2Buti, Rindi, and Werner (2015) also models intermarket competition without asymmetric information.
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where private information is relatively short lived. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) models
a dealer market and “crossing network” which can be thought of as an exchange and dark pool.
This paper finds that informed traders with short lived private information will be more likely
trade on exchange than informed traders with long lived private information. Zhu (2014) finds
that all else equal, a shorter horizon of private information can cause more aggressive use of
dark pools by informed traders. Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) formalizes a “pecking-order
hypothesis” of trading venues. This study examines a setting of symmetrically informed traders
who choose between trading on a “lit” venue that guarantees execution, a “midpoint matching dark
pool” which executes trades at the exchange midpoint, but doesn’t guarantee execution if there are
order imbalances, and a “non-midpoint matching dark pool” which is run by a single competitive
liquidity provider. If trading needs become more urgent, exchanges will be at the top of the pecking
order.
Empirically, Conrad, Wahal, and Johnson (2003) examines institutional order data and estimates
that orders executed in Alternative Trading Systems (ATSs, U.S. regulatory term for non-exchange
trading venues) save 13 cents per share. Ye (2010) finds that observed bid-ask spread costs in dark
pools are 20% lower and that orders have a fill rate of 4% in NYSE stocks.3 Tuttle (2013) finds that
ATSs fill 0.69% of orders in a more recent sample. Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1998) examines
trading on the New York Stock Exchange and Cincinnati Stock Exchange. Hendershott and Jones
(2005) studies an ATS’s decision to “go dark” in order to examine the impact of pre-trade opacity in
several Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). O’Hara and Ye (2011) finds that increased fragmentation
of trading (due in part to increased off-exchange trading) improves market quality. Buti, Rindi,
and Werner (2011) uses a sample of 11 self-reporting dark pools at a daily frequency to examine
the relationship between the share of trading done in dark pools and measures of market quality
and price informativeness and finds that dark pools improve market quality, but have a complex
relationship with price discovery. Weaver (2014) uses a sample of all off-exchange trading and
3Exchange fill rates for marketable orders are nearly 100% and fill rates for all order types are also significantly higher
than dark pool fill rates.
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finds that off-exchange trading harms market quality. Comerton-Forde and Putnins (2015) uses a
different empirical approach with data from Australia (which is a smaller market with a different
institutional setup) and finds that some dark pool trading can be good for price discovery, but
too much dark pool trading will harm it. Hatheway, Kwan, and Zheng (2014) argues that dark
pools harm both market quality and price informativeness. There have been other significant
changes in U.S. equity market structure that have coincided with the growth of dark pools and
may make inference difficult. For example, the recent increase in trading done in dark pools has
been accompanied in part by an increase in algorithmic and high frequency trading which also
may also have affected market quality and efficiency.4 My study complements the literature by
employing an alternative empirical approach. I do this with, to my knowledge, the largest and
most comprehensive sample of identified dark pool trading in NYSE and NASDAQ listed stocks
to date.
Fleming and Nguyen (2014) examines where the informed trade between the limit order book
and “workup” functionality for U.S. government securities trading on the BrokerTec electronic
trading platform. This functionality has pre-trade opacity and passive pricing. However, BrokerTec
only supports trading exclusively in a limit order book or the workup process at a given point
in time. In equity markets, traders can submit orders to both types of venues simultaneously.
Furthermore, the institutional information structure of treasury markets is not typically associated
with insider information. My study provides a different setting for testing the theory of intermarket
competition and contributing to our understanding of equity market structure. In a contemporaneous
effort to mine, the empirical portion of Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) examines the dynamic
inter-relation between trading in different venues using a high frequency, one month panel of 117
NASDAQ-listed stocks to find support for the predictions of the “pecking order hypothesis” set
forth in the theoretical portion of the study. While doing so, Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015)
examines all off-exchange trading and focuses on the behavior of “high frequency traders” as
classified by NASDAQ. One concern when attempting to use the equilibrium outcome of a trade
4For example, see Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld (2011) and Conrad, Wahal, and Xiang (2015).
9
print to make inferences about trading venue preferences is that the outcome of a trade may not
capture the nature of order routing before a trade execution. This is because a trade print does
not necessarily reflect the first choice of venue of a trader. My approach is complementary as
it examines a larger panel of identified dark pool trading at a lower frequency, covers a more
recent sample period, focuses on a large group of identified dark pools rather than attempting
to confront the greater complexity of all off-exchange trading, uses a larger and more diverse
sample of corporate news, and examines the behavior of short sellers rather than high frequency
traders. Furthermore, my study’s main focus is to find support for all of the theory of intermarket
competition, especially theory which is rooted in information economics.
2.4 Short Sellers as Informed Traders
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) explains our understanding of short sellers with bravado,
“Throughout the financial economics literature, short sellers occupy an exalted place in the pantheon
of investors as rational, informed market participants who act to keep prices in line”. Diamond and
Verrecchia (1987) provides a theoretical explanation as to why short sellers may be informed. This
paper illustrates that when short selling is relatively costly (because short sellers can not use the
full proceeds of their short sales), short sellers will be relatively informed traders. Miller (1977),
Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002), and Hong, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) show that prices
may diverge from fundamental values when short selling is constrained. Empirically, research
has studied the return predictability of short sellers. Using both short interest and short volume
data, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005), Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009), and Boehmer, Huszar,
and Jordan (2010), among others show that heavily shorted stocks underperform lightly shorted
stocks. Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) examines which short sales are informed using a panel
of NYSE order data with trader type classifications. Using a higher frequency panel of short-sales,
Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putnins (2015) finds that intraday raw returns after marketable short
sales are negative.
A more recent literature has examined how short sellers obtain their information advantage.
Some research conjectures that short sales are related to well-known asset pricing anomalies
10
(see Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001 and Hanson and Sunderam, 2014, among
others) or results from strategically trading against buyers (see So and Wang, 2014 and Arif,
Ben-Rephael, and Lee, 2015). Another established explanation of the short sellers’ information
advantage comes from a group of studies that examine short selling surrounding corporate news
releases. Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010), Karpoff and
Lou (2010), and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2012) find evidence of increased short selling prior
to announcements of earnings, equity analyst ratings changes, announcements of firm misconduct,
and “cash flow” news, respectively. Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) studies short selling
around news events and not only finds evidence of increased short selling in the days leading up to
negative news, but that much of return predictability of short sellers occurs on news release days.
I take a notion of informed trading from this literature and contribute to our understanding of short
sellers by studying where short sellers exploit their information advantage.
2.5 Corporate News and Information Asymmetry
Corporate news has long been associated with asymmetric information. While conventional
wisdom in information economics models public and private information as substitutes and suggests
that news announcements reduce information asymmetry (see Kyle, 1985; Glosten and Milgrom,
1985; Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald, 1991; and Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987; among others),
more recent studies argue that news may create information asymmetry. The general intuition
behind the latter view is that news releases may lead to differential interpretations by traders
based on variation in the distribution of information processing skill or capacity (e.g. Kandel
and Pearson, 1995 and Hong and Stein, 1999, among others). Engelberg (2008) and Demers
and Vega (2008) find that “soft” information can be predictive of post announcement returns and
provide opportunities for informed trade by superior information processors. Engelberg, Reed,
and Ringgenberg (2012) finds that a disproportionate amount of short sellers’ return predictability
coincides with news release days. I use corporate news releases to identify firm-specific information
events, which may reflect instances in which private information exists and is short lived to find
support for one or more mechanisms in the intermarket competition literature. Furthermore my
11
results provide evidence regarding whether public news resolves or creates information asymmetry.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
As discussed in Chapter 2, Zhu (2014) predicts that the introduction of a dark pool will result in
relatively more informed trade on exchange. Adapting a set of return predictability tests from the
short sales literature (See Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Engelberg Reed and Ringgenberg,
2012; and Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putnins, 2015; among others) to my setting, I translate this
prediction into two sets of tests which examine where the informed trade and where short sales
are most informed. To align my research design with theory of intermarket competition, I separate
and aggregate trading into representative venues; trading in dark pools and trading on exchanges.
I only consider stocks that trade in both dark pools and on exchanges in my sample.1,2,3
3.1 Data
The sample employed in this study consists of media reportable trading for the disaggregated
FINRA Trade Reporting Facilities Data (TRF), the RavenPack news release database, Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) daily stock data, short sale data obtained from the exchanges
and FINRA, Security Information Processor (SIP) NBBO data, FINRA Order Audit Trail System
(OATS) data, and NYSE Trade and Quote (TAQ) data. The sample period spans August 2012
through June 2014. I consider trading during regular trading hours (9:30:00 through 16:00:00
EST).4 Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2014) shows that dark pools lose a significant amount
1There are no stocks that trade exclusively in dark pools.
2In contrast to some empirical asset pricing and return predictability papers, I’m not advocating that the returns that
accrue to short sales in my sample represent an factor or implementable strategy to any investor. I simply want to
examine the relative return predictability of dark pool and exchange short sales in order to understand how information
is incorporated in equity prices.
3To examine where the informed trade, in the reported results, I allow stocks which do not trade in either dark pools or
exchanges on a given day to drop out from the sample on a given day. Results are qualitatively similar when I restrict
attention to the same set of stocks each day.
4The majority of dark pools in my sample do not host after hours trading.
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of market share when stock prices drop below one dollar and the minimum exchange tick size
drops below one cent; consequently, I remove stocks that had a daily closing price below one
dollar at some point in the sample. I am left with a sample of 3,148 stocks, 1,343,458 stock-day
observations, and 70,993 news events. After filtering out overlapping news events, 24,334 news
events remain.5 In this paper, I focus on trade, which is an outcome of order routing.
3.1.1 Trade Reporting Facilities
Trade Reporting Facilities data are collected by FINRA for regulatory purposes. The TRF data
contain U.S. stock transactions that are effected otherwise than on an exchange. FINRA requires
that these trades be reported as soon as practicable but within 10 seconds, although the timestamp
of execution is also provided by submitting party. While trades reported to the TRF appear in public
data sources such as TAQ, all non-exchange trading is reported the same way. Consequently, one
is not able to differentiate dark pool trading from other types of non-exchange trading using TAQ
or other high frequency public data sources.6 These disaggregated data allow me to identify dark
pool trading. More importantly, I am able to identify and classify individual venues. The sample
is constructed using the approach of Kwan, Masulis, and McInish (2014), but the data used in my
study span a larger panel of stocks and to my knowledge, contains a more comprehensive set of
identified dark pools for NASDAQ listed stocks. Furthermore, in contrast to Kwan, Masulis, and
McInish (2014), these data allow me to identify dark pool trading for non-NASDAQ listed stocks.
The final sample consists of trade level data for 24 dark pools. The sample of dark pools in this
paper host up to 16% of total trading by the end of the sample, which is close to recent estimates
that dark pool trading now comprises 17% of total trading volume (see Footnote 2). As of the
second calendar quarter of 2014, the dark pools in my sample comprise nine of the top ten and 17
of the top 20 non-Alternative Display Facility ATSs reporting to FINRA in terms of volume traded
5In parts of the analysis, I remove ten days from the sample that correspond to options expiration or “witching days”
due to irregular changes in trading volume.
6Other types of off-exchange trading may include internalization, among other types of trading.
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and comprise approximately 85% of ATS volume reported to FINRA for ATSs of interest.7
3.1.2 RavenPack Corporate News Releases
RavenPack is a leading provider of real-time news and sentiment analytics in finance. It
provides a database of corporate news releases accompanied by analytics. I consider categorized
press releases, full articles, news flashes, and hot news flashes from the Dow Jones Newswire.
RavenPack provides a timestamp of when the story was received by RavenPack, which coincides
with when the news is released. If a story is released after 16:00:00, I consider the following
trading day to be the event day. RavenPack provides a relevance score that determines how relevant
a story is to a given company. RavenPack categorizes news releases into several categories ranging
from conventional categories such as earnings to less frequently occurring news events such as
labor issues covering events including executive resignations. To avoid overlapping news events
and allay concerns of multicollinearity, I remove news events in a given stock that are within
15 calendar days of another news event for the same stock after presenting descriptive statistics.
RavenPack also classifies categorized news as scheduled or unscheduled. RavenPack provides a
sentiment score based on analytics that in some cases attempts to account for market expectations;
however, like Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), I opt to evaluate news based on the event
day market reaction as it may better reflect a divergence from the market’s prior expectations.8,9
7To allay concerns regarding the sensitivity of these data, I aggregate ATSs into categories so that the specific practices
of any one ATS are not revealed.
8Results are qualitatively similar when I sign news with RavenPack’s sentiment score and available in the appendix.
9Similarly to Keim, Massa, and von Beschwitz (2013) I consider stories with a relevance score of 100 in order to
reduce noise. RavenPack also provides novelty scores in order to link multiple stories that cover the same event. I
use stories with novelty scores of 100 in order to filter out redundant news releases similarly to Engelberg, Reed, and
Ringgenberg (2012) which applies an algorithm to accomplish the same task. If multiple news releases regarding
the same topic occur on same day, I treat them as one news event. Following Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg
(2012), I exclude categories that have less than 999 stories in the sample. Furthermore, I filter out categories of
stories relating to market activity, such as the “technical analysis”, “prices”, and “trading” categories since they don’t
represent corporate events. I remove stories regarding “insider-trading” because they comprise roughly half of the
categorized news events and cluster in time and I would be required to drop the majority of them and other news
events had I not initially filtered them out. Finally, I remove stories regarding “revenues” and “investor relations”
because they are typically in close proximity to earnings announcements.
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3.1.3 Other Sources
The CRSP US Stock Database contains daily market and corporate action data for securities
with primary listings on NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NASDAQ. I use stock data for U.S. listed
common stocks (CRSP share codes 10 and 11; Exchange codes 1, 2, and 3) with positive market
capitalization.
The TAQ database contains intraday trade and quote data for securities listed on NYSE Group
exchanges as well as NASDAQ issues. I calculate trading volume during regular trading hours by
summing trade sizes, after filtering out trades with a price of less than zero and with a correction
indicator other than zero in TAQ. I also use the Daily TAQ NBBO files appended by more NBBO
records from the quotes files in order to compute midquote returns.10 I use the TAQ “master files”
in order to merge CRSP, RavenPack, short sale data, and TAQ and subsequently merge with the
TRF data.
Short sale trade level data and daily short sale volume totals are obtained from the exchanges
and FINRA.11 In the majority of cases, I am able to obtain trade level files and examine trading
during regular trading hours. I am only able to obtain files at a daily frequency from NYSE Arca.
National Stock Exchange (NSX) trade level short sale data is missing for January of 2014, so I use
the daily frequency data for that month.12 I am also missing short sale data for the CBSX, which
ceased operations in early 2014.13 I report results for short sales that are not marked as exempt from
the alternative uptick rule; which is activated after large stock price fluctuations and requires that
short sellers transact at prices above the national best bid. In line with the short sales literature, I
10In order to remove spurious quotes, I inspect end of minute NBBO midquotes which represented a 20% log return
from their previous level and manually remove them if I deem them to be spurious (if they immediately revert).
11Regulation SHO forbids underreporting of short sales, but does not forbid over reporting of short sales. I assume
any misreporting to be i.i.d. across trading venues.
12The NSX hosted less than one percent of trading in January 2014.
13The CBSX stopped providing short sale data on their website after June 2011 and represented less than one percent
of total trading volume in January 2013.
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filter out exempt short sales to better identify informed short sales.14 Short sales marked as exempt
comprise roughly 6.0% of total short sale volume in the sample.15
The SIPs link the U.S. equity markets by processing and consolidating all protected quotes and
trades from contributing trading venues. I obtain NBBOs from the UTP SIP and CQS SIP NBBO
files for NASDAQ and NYSE Group listed stocks, respectively. I filter out NBBO records that
correspond to locked and crossed markets.
TRF execution timestamps during my sample are only at a one second frequency, so in order
to look at trade prices in dark pools relative to the outstanding NBBO, I use a sample of TRF data
that is merged with OATS data with millisecond timestamps. OATS is an integrated audit trail of
order, quote, and trade information for all NMS stocks and OTC equity securities. FINRA uses
this audit trail system to recreate events in the life cycle of orders and more completely monitor
the trading practices of member firms. In the sample, approximately 75% of trading in the TRF is
successfully matched to OATS.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Stock level summary statistics for variables of interest are presented in Table 5.1. Panel A
presents the mean, median, 1st and 99th percentiles, and standard deviation for the number of novel
news events per stock-day, the percentage of trading volume executed in dark pools, the percentage
of exchange trading volume that was sold short, the percentage of dark pool trading volume that
was sold short, and average market capitalization of the stocks over the sample. Dark pool trading
comprises 13.1% of a stock’s trading volume on average over the sample. Exchange short sales
represent 45.7% of a stock’s exchange trading volume on average.16 Short sale volume executed
in dark pools represents 37.0% of a stock’s dark pool trading volume on average. The stock level
14Results are qualitatively similar when I consider exempt short sales and available upon request.
15There are a broad set of exemptions from the alternative uptick rule, including a broker dealer indicating that they
conducted their own price test and certain very narrowly defined types of arbitrage activity, among others. For more
on the alternative uptick rule and exemptions, see http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/34-61595.pdf.
16I standardize the sample of exchange short sales by total TAQ Daily Volume for exchange codes not equal to “D”,
which corresponds to off-exchange trading.
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dark pool short ratio and its exchange counterpart are statistically distinguishable. These results
indicate that dark pools host a different composition of trade than exchanges.
Panel B presents frequency counts of the number of novel news events in the sample by
category. There are 11 categories in total. This panel suggests that there is a wide sample of
types of news events, many of which have been studied individually in the financial economics
literature.17
To gain an understanding of the intertemporal nature of aggregate dark pool trading and short
sales over the sample, the time series of the share of daily total trading volume executed in dark
pools (black solid line), the share of total exchange volume that was sold short (grey dashed line),
and the share of dark pool trading volume that was sold short (black dashed line) across all stocks
in the sample are presented in Figure 6.1. Exchange short sale volume represents slightly more
than half of exchange trading volume throughout the sample while dark pool short sale volume
comprises slightly less than half of dark pool trading volume throughout most of the sample. This
is likely due not only to an increasing amount of longer horizon short selling in equity markets
and reduced shorting constraints (see Hanson and Sunderam, 2014) but also to an increase in
high frequency trading in equity markets.18,19 While I do not observe the position closing activity
of short sellers, Jones, Reed, and Waller (2015), Boehmer, Duong, and Huszar (2015), and Von
17I confirm that unsigned returns are significantly larger and these days and results are available in the appendix.
18There is both theoretical and empirical evidence which suggest that some non-designated market intermediaries,
particularly high frequency traders are informed. Foucault, Hombert, and Rosu (2015) develops a model with “high
frequency speculators” and finds that both their relatively high frequency trading and lower frequency inventory
accumulation will be informed. Using data on high frequency traders as identified by NASDAQ, Brogaard,
Hendershott, and Riordan (2014) finds that high frequency traders trade in the direction of permanent price changes
and opposite temporary price changes. Carrion (2013) also studies the inventory accumulation activity of high
frequency traders on the NASDAQ and finds that they have market-timing ability. In the appendix, I show that
stock-day percentages of trading volume sold short do not sort with stock day cancel to trade ratios (a proxy of
high frequency trading) especially meaningfully. On the other hand, stock-month percentages of trading volume
sold short do monotonically sort with stock-month ratios of short interest to shares outstanding (a proxy of lower
frequency short selling).
19Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putnins (2015) finds that exchange short sales partially consist of non-marketable limit
orders. Several models including: Kaniel and Liu (2006), Goettler, Parlour, and Rajan (2009), Boulatov and George
(2013), and Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2015), among others find that under some conditions, informed
traders will use limit orders and Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2015) empirically finds that informed sellers
are more likely to use limit orders than informed buyers.
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Beschwitz and Massa (2015) study daily short position data find a mean short position duration of
weeks over recent samples. To study higher frequency short sales strategies, I also examine the
intraday return predictability of venue short sales.
Dark pool trading volume comprises as much as 16% of trading volume at the end of the
sample. This percentage is close to recent estimates that dark pools host 17% of trading volume
(see Footnote 2). Short sales in dark pools represent a smaller proportion total short volume relative
to the percentage of total trading volume in dark pools. The share of volume sold short in dark
pools is statistically distinguishable from its exchange counterpart. These results suggest that dark
pools host a different composition of traders than exchanges.
The relative stability of these series is in contrast with previous research using less recent
sample periods. In Figure 1 of Zhu (2014), the share of trading volume executed in dark pools
had been significantly trending upward. The share of trading volume being sold short is also
significantly trending upward in the commonly used Reg-SHO sample which spans 2005 through
2007. This may be evidence that equity trading is approaching an equilibrium level of short sales
and dark pool trading, which makes this study’s sample a better setting for testing theory. I reject
the null of a unit-root in Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for all four series presented in Figure 6.1.
3.3 Dark Pool Categories
In addition to the main empirical design of this paper, I further disaggregate the dark pools in
my sample into three groups. While there are several dimensions across which dark pools may
differ, I infer classifications from the data. There have been episodes of dark pools misleading
customers with regard to their business practices.20 Inferring dark pool categories from the data
may teach us the most about these institutions. For example, Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi, and Tuzun
(2016) infers trader categories from account level audit trail data to learn about the ecosystem of
the E-mini S&P 500 Futures Contract.
I classify the dark pools in my sample using two characteristics: the percentage of trades
20For example, Pipeline Financial Group Inc. and Barclays have both been accused of misleading customers with
regard to the practices of their dark pools. See, “Pipeline’s Chairman, Chief Are Said to Leave Dark-Pool Firm After
Scandal”, Bloomberg, November 15, 2011 and Footnote 10.
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inside the NBBO and trade size. There are both theoretical and practical reasons to classify dark
pools along these dimensions. Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) conjectures that there is a
pecking order of trading venues, specifically exchanges, midpoint dark pools, and non-midpoint
dark pools. Furthermore, the SEC is considering implementing a trade-at rule which would require
that off-exchange trades which cannot significantly improve upon exchanges’ best price be routed
to exchanges.21This type of order flow is likely most reflected in non-midpoint dark pool trading.
Since I am unable to obtain millisecond timestamps for trading in two dark pools, I classify the
remaining 22 into Block Dark Pools (4), Non-Midpoint Dark Pools (11), and Midpoint Dark Pools
(7). Block Dark Pools are characterized by having larger trade sizes. Midpoint Dark Pools are
characterized by having smaller trade sizes than Block Dark Pools and a high relative proportion of
trades inside the NBBO and at the NBBO midpoint. Non-Midpoint Dark Pools are characterized
by having smaller trade sizes than Block Dark Pools, and a lower relative proportion of trades
inside the NBBO and at the NBBO midpoint compared to Midpoint Dark Pools.
Statistically, Block Dark Pools, Midpoint Dark Pools, and Non-Midpoint Dark Pools host
0.57%, 3.86%, and 8.88% of trading volume and 15.35%, 42.82%, and 48.37% of their trading
volume are short sales, respectively. Of the trades matched to OATS, 82.42%, 44.51%, and 21.66%
of Block Dark Pools, Midpoint Dark Pools, and Non-Midpoint Dark Pools trade prints are at
the prices equal to the NBBO Midpoint, respectively. Of the trades matched to OATS, 87.18%,
57.83%, and 33.08% of Block Dark Pools, Midpoint Dark Pools, and Non-Midpoint Dark Pools
trade prints are at prices inside the NBBO, respectively. The averages of the category constituent
venues’ average trade sizes of Block Dark Pools, Midpoint Dark Pools, and Non-Midpoint Dark
Pools are 9702 shares, 247 shares, and 183 shares, respectively.22
In the appendix I also show that the main results are qualitatively similar for relatively idiosyncratic
deviations from the standard dark pool design. According to regulatory filings, some dark pools
21For studies of variants of trade-at rule implementations in Canada and Australia, see Comerton-Forde, Malinova,
and Park (2015) and Foley and Putnins (2016).
22For more information regarding these categories, see the appendix.
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offer a discrete-time cross in addition to a continuous cross. Some dark pools allow “pool clubbing”
where users will indicate that they only want to trade against certain types of accounts. Some dark
pools allow participants to send non-binding conditional orders which are displayed to some other
market participants or dark pool operators themselves will display some orders or send non-binding
“indications of interest”. Some dark pools offer crossing at a volume weighted average price
(VWAP) in addition to crossing at and within the NBBO.23
3.4 Where are Short Sales Most Informed?
In this section, I examine where short sales are most informed. Stated alternatively, I examine
where short sales exhibit the most return predictability cross-sectionally and at higher frequency.
Following Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008), among others, if short sellers are informed in a
given trading venue, then the stocks they heavily short should underperform the stocks they lightly
short. Intuitively, this line of research asks how good short sellers are at relative valuation.24 I first
adopt a portfolio approach to measure cross-sectional differences in trading venue short sales and
future returns. I begin by sorting stocks by shorting flow measures and type of trading venue. As in
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) and Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), each day, I sort
stocks into quintiles based on trading venue shorting volume standardized by the corresponding
trading venue volume.25 After stocks are sorted into quintiles each day, I construct value-weighted
portfolios for the following 20 trading days. This process is repeated each trading day which
results in overlapping 20 day holding period returns. To address this overlap, I employ a variant of
23One mechanism that I cannot sharply empirically identify is the fact that dark pools have different sets of participants,
and that these participant lists are non-nested across dark pools. This may be the limiting case of the tradeoff between
transactions costs and probability of trade where P (Trade) = 0 for some traders in one, or multiple dark pools.
To the extent that this is a time and cross-sectionally invariant mechanism, this may affect my unconditional results
(which can be thought of as a level), it is less likely to affect my news results or cross-sectional sorts (which can be
thought of as a change).
24Relative valuation may be encompassed by long-short and market-neutral investment strategies.
25The choice of scaling trading venue short sale volume by the corresponding venue total trading venue volume is
deliberate. If I were to scale by an alternative variable, such as total trading volume, then the cross-sectional variation
in the share of total trading executed in dark pools would also enter the variable of interest, confounding inferences
regarding the hypotheses of this paper. The choice to scale by total trading volume is in line with the short sales
literature and is motivated by the fact that large firms are characterized by having relatively more lendable shares for
short sales (see Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008, among others).
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the calendar-time approach used in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang
(2008), among others. Each trading day’s portfolio return is the simple average of 20 different
daily portfolio returns and 1/20 of the portfolio is effectively rebalanced each day. Formally, the
daily return of a portfolio is:
Rp,t =
1
20
20∑
k=1
Qi,pt−kw
i,p
t−1Ri,t, (3.1)
Where Qi,pt−k is an indicator variable set to one if and only if the i
th security is assigned to
portfolio p based on trading venue short selling activity on day [t−k]; wi,pt−1 are market capitalization
weights on day t − 1; and Ri,t is the raw return of stock i on day t. Average daily calendar-time
returns are reported in percent multiplied by 20 (to state returns in approximately monthly terms),
with t-statistics based on an i.i.d. daily time series as in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008). I
control for systematic risk and momentum with the standard Carhart (1997) time series regression:
Rt −Rrf,t = α + β1MKTRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + t, (3.2)
Raw returns of trading venue short sale portfolios and the alphas by venue type from Equation
2 are reported in Table A.6. Panel B presents results across various portfolio holding horizons.
Results suggest that short sellers are good at relative valuation, and may be better at avoiding
undervalued stocks (consistent with Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008, among others). Where
the results for exchange short sales and dark pool short sales diverge the most is the degree of
cross-sectional return predictability. Heavily shorted stocks in dark pools underperform corresponding
lightly shorted stocks by a four-factor adjusted average 0.53% over the following 20 trading days.
While these returns are non-trivial, they are slightly more than half of the corresponding returns for
portfolios formed on exchange short sales: 0.89% (10.70% annualized). The spread of exchange
and dark pool long-short portfolios has an annualized alpha of 4.29% which is statistically significant.
While there is some evidence of informed short selling taking place in dark pools, I interpret these
results as evidence that there is a relatively lower degree of informed short selling taking place in
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dark pools relative to on exchanges.26 For the 20 day holding horizon, the long-short alphas for
Block, Midpoint, and Non-Midpoint alphas are 0.18%, 0.29%, and 0.55%, respectively (t-stats of
1.59, 2.01, and 4.45, respectively). Block Dark Pool short selling does not appear to be informed
while Non-Midpoint Dark Pools, whose observables are closest to those of exchanges, appear
to have the most informed short selling of the dark pools.27 In Panel B, I find that the return
predictability of short sellers decays to some extent as the holding horizon becomes longer for all
types of trading venues, though results are qualitatively similar for different holding horizons.
I next examine the cross-sectional relationship between trading venue short sales and future
returns of stocks using a regression based approach in order to simultaneously control for multiple
characteristics. As in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) and Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg
(2012), I employ a variant of the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Specifically, I estimate
452 daily cross-sectional regressions which eventually are of the form:
Reti,t+1:t+20 = α + β1Shorti,t + β
′X+ i,t, (3.3)
Where the dependent variable is the 20 day cumulative raw or adjusted return of stock i
starting on day t + 1 (skipping one day after measuring shorting activity), Shorti,t is either
stock-day exchange short volume divided by corresponding exchange trading volume (ExShortV ol
ExV ol
)
or dark pool short volume divided by corresponding dark pool trading volume (DPShortV ol
DPV ol
); and
X is a vector of control variables including the stock’s previous month book-to-market value and
natural log of size (calculated as in Fama and French, 1993). Adjusted returns are calculated
using the 125 size, book-to-market, and momentum portfolios introduced in Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers (1997) and series are all standardized to have a zero mean each day.28, I
26Results are qualitatively similar when I consider equal weighted portfolios. Results are available in the appendix.
27Not enough stocks are traded in Block Dark Pools each day to populate all five portfolios, so I form two portfolios,
consisting of the most and least shorted stocks in Block Dark Pools.
28Results are qualitatively similar when I adjust for risk with lagged quarterly Fama and French (1993) three-factor
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use a Fama-MacBeth approach of taking the time series mean of daily parameter estimates, with
Newey-West (1987) standard errors (using 20 lags) as in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) and
Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012). Results are presented in Table 5.3. Panel A presents
results for exchange short sales and Panel B presents results for dark pool short sales. In Panel
C, I incorporate the disaggregated dark pool types into the Fama MacBeth approach, eventually
including all venue short sales in the same specification. Each row corresponds to a separate
specification. I exclude Block Dark Pools because they don’t host trades in a large number of
stocks.29 Both dark pool and exchange short sales are related to future returns. However, the
magnitude of the coefficients for exchange short sales are roughly twice the size of their dark pool
short sales counterparts. The parameter estimate series for ExShortV ol
ExV ol
is statistically distinguishable
from its dark pool counterpart. After including controls, this gap persists. Interestingly, t-statistics
for dark pool short sale coefficients are slightly larger than their exchange counterparts. I interpret
this as further evidence that informed short selling is concentrated on exchanges. In Panel C,
when venue short sales are included in the same specification, the estimate for Midpoint Dark
Pools becomes statistically insignificant (coefficient of -0.065, t-statistic of -1.21). The estimate
for exchange short sales is larger than that of Non-Midpoint Dark Pools and both are statistically
significant (coefficients of -1.177 and -0.408, respectively). These results suggest that exchange
short sales provide the most incremental explanatory power of returns, then Non-Midpoint dark
pools, while Midpoint Dark Pools do not contain any incremental explanatory power of returns.
Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putnins (2015) makes the point that since some short sellers
employ high-frequency trading strategies, understanding the behavior of short sellers in today’s
markets requires observations at intraday horizons. Consequently, I examine the return predictability
of short sales by trading venue at higher frequency. Due to computational and data limitations,
I perform the proceeding intraday analyses on a stratified sample of 439 stocks over a sample
spanning September 2012 through June 2014. The 439 stock sample consists of 152 stocks
model loadings and available upon request.
29Results are qualitatively similar when I include Block Dark Pools and available upon request.
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randomly selected from each size tercile, 76 of these stocks being NYSE Group listed and 76
being NASDAQ listed. Several stocks were removed due to consistently spurious quotes, leaving
439 stocks. The list of stratified tickers is available in the appendix.30
Adapting the approach of Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putnins (2015) to my setup, I take two
types of executed trading venue order flow, exchange and dark pool, and for each stock I aggregate
each type of executed order flow over five-minute intervals. The five-minute sampling frequency
has significance in the realized volatility literature for being relatively robust to microstructure
noise while still capturing economically meaningful variation (see Liu, Sheppard, and Patton,
2015, among others). For calculating returns, I use the midquote that is in effect at the end of
each five-minute interval. Figure A.4 presents the average cumulative excess log midquote returns
(in basis points) pooled over all stocks and five-minute intervals, weighted by dollar volume of the
particular sale type.31 Post-trade cumulative midquote excess returns are presented for horizons
of up to one trading day. Exchange (grey dashed line) post trade excess returns are consistently
lower than their dark pool (black solid line) counterparts. To determine whether the patterns in this
figure are statistically significant, I adapt the panel regression approach of Comerton-Forde, Jones,
and Putnins (2015) to my setting. More formally for a time horizon k following trade in stock i
in 5-minute interval t, I regress the cumulative post-trade midpoint excess return ri,t,t+k (in basis
points) on indicator variables separately for all dark pool short sales, 1DP , and possible stock fixed
effects, respectively:
ri,t,t+k = αi + β11DP + i,t (3.4)
The indicator variables are configured to allow direct tests of differences between exchange
and dark pool short sales. Model 1 has a fixed intercept no fixed effects while Model 2 has stock
30In some of these analyses, I do not separate Block Dark Pool trading because there is not consistent enough trading
in the stratified sample.
31Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putnins (2015) makes the point that dollar weighting better reflects the performance of
short sellers. When I weigh trades equally, results are qualitatively similar and available in the appendix.
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fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by five minute intervals. Observations are weighted
by dollar volume.32 The base case in this regression is exchange short sales. I examine post-trade
horizons of five minutes, 30 minutes, two hours, and one trading day. Results are presented in Table
A.8. Panel A presents results for all dark pools. Cumulative post-trade log returns after exchange
short sales are negative for horizons longer than 30 minutes and continue to drift downward. After
one trading day, cumulative post-exchange short sales are 1.501 basis points (3.78% annualized)
lower than their dark pool counterparts. Cumulative dark pool post-short sale log returns are
statistically distinguishable from their exchange counterparts for post-trade horizons longer than
five minutes. Both dark pool and exchange short sales are followed by consistently downward
drifting cumulative returns. In Panel B, I separate dark pools into Midpoint and Non-Midpoint
Dark Pools and results are qualitatively similar. Non-Midpoint Dark Pool post-trade returns are
lower than those of Midpoint dark pools. Results are quantitatively similar for specifications with
stock-fixed effects.
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995), among others note that order flow is persistent and Menkveld,
Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) documents cross-dependencies between venue type trading. While
conditioning on short sales in a single five minute interval most closely reflects the performance of
short sellers, I also study the dynamic relationship among venue short sales and returns. I follow
Comerton-Forde, Jones, and Putnins (2015) by implementing a variant of the Hasbrouck (1991)
“information content of trade” vector autoregressive framework to my trading partition. For each
stock, I estimate the following system over the entire sample period:
32Results are qualitatively similar when I weigh trades equally and available in the appendix.
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(3.5)
where t denotes the five-minute interval and individual stock subscripts are suppressed.33 xEX
and xDP denote exchange and dark pool dollar volumes in a given five-minute interval. rt is
the excess log midquote return. I estimate five lags of each variable.34 A separate estimation
is conducted for each stock over the sample and coefficients and impulse response functions
are averaged across all stocks. To make the impulse responses more comparable across volume
types, the magnitude of each volume shock is set equal to the standard deviation of unanticipated
exchange short volume. Figure 6.3 presents equally weighted impulse response functions of excess
midquote returns after trading venue short sale shocks over one trading day. The left vertical axis
measures cumulative post-exchange short sale shock returns and the right vertical axis measures
post dark pool short sale shock returns. Post exchange short sale shock returns (grey solid line) are
0.854 basis points (2.15% annualized) lower than corresponding post dark pool short sale returns
(black dashed line) after one trading day.
Collectively, the unconditional evidence suggests that short sales and their return predictability
are relatively concentrated on exchanges relative to dark pools.35 This finding is consistent with
33For reasons related to data limitations and methodological considerations discussed above, I do not estimate this
system in trade time or at higher frequency.
34For a subsample of stocks in this sample, five lags was the most common BIC-minimizing lag length.
35Treynor (1981), Perold (1988), and Edwards and Wagner (1993), among others illustrate that the concept of
transaction costs is multifaceted. In my setting, shares for short sales are borrowed at the account level, not the
trading venue level, so trading venues do not directly affect shorting costs. While I can’t empirically measure
explicit transactions costs (such as fees) across trading venues, they do not affect inferences regarding how trading
incorporates information into equity prices. Differential Implicit transaction costs across venues such as bid-ask
spread costs, market impact, and opportunity costs may bias my return predictability results if, for example, dark
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the prediction of Zhu (2014) that the introduction of a dark pool to the market structure will induce
segmentation of informed trade.
3.5 Intermarket Competition and Information Horizon
I next ask, where do the informed trade when private information is short lived. The theory
of intermarket competition suggests that if private information is short lived, or when traders may
have a shock to their need for immediacy, then traders’ choice of venue may change. Furthermore,
the news releases in the sample are established in the literature as containing firm-specific, value
relevant news. Consequently, news releases provide a more concrete, identifiable sample of events
associated with firm-specific information and short lived information.
As discussed in Chapter 2, Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) predicts that exchanges will
capture a greater proportion of trading volume if there is a shock to traders’ need for immediacy.
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) predicts that informed traders with short lived information will
use exchanges and Zhu (2014) predicts that all else equal, a shorter information horizon will result
in more aggressive use of dark pools by informed traders. Consequently, I examine whether dark
pools capture an increased proportion of trading volume and whether there is evidence of increased
short selling and short sale return predictability surrounding corporate news events.
To examine how trading in dark pools responds to news events for the five days surrounding
news releases.36 I adopt a panel multi-regression approach where I vary the timing of the dependent
variable relative to the news event. Specifically, I estimate five panel regressions of the form:
DPV oli,t
V oli,t
= αi + αm + β1LogSpreadi,t + β2rV IX,t + β31Newsi,t + i,t, (3.6)
where DPV oli,t
V oli,t
is the stock-day outcome variable, the share of trading volume executed in dark
pool short sales are executed at systematically higher prices than exchange short sales intraday. In the appendix, I
show that the stock-day volume weighted average prices that dark pool and exchange short sellers pay on average are
not statistically distinguishable from one another suggesting that dark pool short sales aren’t systematically executed
at higher trade prices than exchange short sales intraday. However, this result need not imply that dark pools provide
cost savings as I do not observe parent orders.
36I confirm that trading volume does not significantly increase until the day prior to news releases and results are
available upon request.
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pools for a given stock-day, αi denotes stock fixed effects, and αm denotes month fixed effects.37
1Newsi,t represents an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a news event occurs, and
zero otherwise. Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015) show that the share of trading taking place in
dark pools responds to VIX shocks, so I include log percentage return of the VIX. I also include
time-weighted average daily log percentage quoted spreads.
In Panel A, I present results for the full panel of stocks around all news events (Panel A1),
scheduled News Events (Panel A2), and unscheduled news events (Panel A3). In Panel B, I
present results for S&P 500 stocks. Since the arrival date of scheduled news known to the public in
advance, uninformed traders may lower exposures to reduce adverse selection risk before scheduled
corporate events and trading may be reflective of belief heterogeneity (see Lee, Mucklow, and
Ready 1993 and Sarkar and Schwartz, 2009). Baruch, Panayides, and Venkataraman (2015) argues
that examining unscheduled corporate news releases provides a better setting for studying informed
trading as uninformed traders likely do not know when unscheduled news will arrive. Similarly,
Sarkar and Schwartz (2009) finds that unscheduled corporate news announcements are preceded
by relatively more one sided trading than scheduled macroeconomic announcements. Du and Zhu
(2014) also analyzes optimal trading frequency in dynamic double auctions and shows that the
nature of news arrival has non-trivial implications for market design. After separating news events,
I am left with 13,776 scheduled events and 10,394 unscheduled events. Results are presented in
Table A.4. Consistent with Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015), I find that the share of trading
executed in dark pools is both negatively associated with the VIX. In the full panel, I find that log
percentage spreads are positively related to the share of trading executed in dark pools, which is
consistent with the prediction of Zhu (2014) that all else equal, an increase in adverse selection
will result in greater dark pool participation. Aside from these, the share of trading in dark pools
increases around corporate news events, starting one day before the news release (an additional
0.577% increase on the event day for the full panel and 0.878% for S&P 500 stocks relative to
the stock-level mean of 13.1%) I find that the increased proportion of trading done in dark pools
37I use the absorption technique for computational reasons.
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around news events is primarily around scheduled news events (an additional 0.936% on the event
day for the full panel and 1.927% for S&P 500 stocks) which suggests that the increased share of
trading dark pools host may not be informed.
Christophe, Ferri, and Angel (2004), Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010), Karpoff and Lou
(2010), and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2012) find evidence of increased short selling prior to
negative news announcements. I add to these findings by examining whether there is evidence of
increased venue short sales prior to news releases with a difference-in-differences-like approach
similar to that of Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), where I vary the timing of the
dependent variable relative to the news event. Specifically, I estimate three panel regressions of the
form:
Shorti,t
V oli,t
= αi+αm+β11Exchangei,t+β21Newsi,t+β3(1Exchangei,t×1Newsi,t)+β′X+ i,t, (3.7)
Where Shorti,t
V oli,t
is the outcome variable (stock-day venue short volume divided by corresponding
total trading volume in percent) for stock i on day t, 1Exchange denotes an indicator variable which
is equal to one if the outcome variable is the ratio of exchange short sales to exchange volume
(making the base case the ratio of dark pool short sales to dark pool volume), 1Newsi,t represents
an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a news event occurs, and zero otherwise, and
the interaction term: (1Exchange × 1Newsi,t) is the variable of interest, measuring the incremental
response of exchange short sales to dark pool short sales prior to and on the day of news releases. If
short sellers are informed, then there should be increased shorting prior to the release of negative
news. Diether, Lee, and Werner (2008) finds that not only do short sellers predict returns, but
that short sellers respond to past returns. The two lags for returns (in percent) are introduced to
control for the return responding behavior of short sellers. αi and αm again denote stock and
month fixed effects, respectively. Results are presented in Table A.3. In Panel A, I find an
increase of the ratio of both dark pool short ratios and exchange short ratios on the day before
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negative news releases. In Panel B, I find that both exchange and dark pool short ratios increase
preceding scheduled negative news, though dark pool short ratio increases by more than exchange
short ratio.38 I interpret the findings for scheduled news releases are consistent with Zhu (2014)
who predicts that a short horizon of private information will result in more aggressive use of the
dark pool by informed traders. As mentioned above, the literature posits that unscheduled news
provides the best sample of events for examining informed trading. In Panel C, I find that dark pool
short ratio does not increase on the day before unscheduled news releases, but the exchange short
ratio increases by 1.514% (relative to stock-level mean of 45.7%.39 This result is consistent with
the predictions of Hendershott and Mendelsen (2000) and Menkveld, Yueshen, and Zhu (2015)
and the magnitudes are comparable with Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012). For a better
understanding of how these magnitudes relate to returns, I conduct an exercise similar to that
of Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012), where I form equal weighted long-short portfolios
similarly to above for dark pool and exchange short sales, conditioning on a stock both being in
the most or least shorted quintile and having an imminent news release the following trading day.40
Figure A.6 presents the cumulative percentage returns of equal-weighted long-short portfolios
conditioning on just venue short sales and portfolios conditioning on venue short sales and a news
release being imminent. The spread between exchange and dark pool short sale cross-sectional
return predictability increases when also conditioning on news being imminent, regardless of the
sign of the news. I interpret this finding as evidence that there is relatively weak evidence of
news-informed short selling dark pools relative to such trading on exchanges.41
I next expand upon the Fama-MacBeth analysis in Table 5.3, including a separate set of news
38I confirm that the increase in exchange short ratio is statistically significant by examining exchange trading on its
own, results are available upon request.
39In the appendix, I show that total trading volume also increases on the day before news releases.
40Results are qualitatively similar when I form value-weighted portfolios and available in the appendix.
41With these results, there is still the possibility that firm specific, time varying confounders are causing a change in
short sales and dark pool share around news rather than the news itself. For example, there are studies discussed in
Chapter 2 that suggest short sellers may be trading on well-known asset pricing anomalies; however, asset pricing
anomalies are also typically slow moving and unlikely to affect short sales precisely before news releases.
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indicator and interaction terms for news event days to statistically test whether short sellers return
predictability changes on or before the day of either type of these news releases. Results are
presented in Table 5.7. Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012) finds that a disproportionate
amount of short sellers’ 20 day return predictability comes on news release days, which suggests
that short sellers are skilled information processors rather than more traditional informed traders.
The results for exchange short sales in Panel A corroborate the other findings in this paper. The
interaction term for exchange short sales on the day prior to news is significantly negative (statistically
significant at the 10 or 5 percent level) for all relevant specifications. These results suggest that
there is an increase in the 20 day return predictability of exchange short sales on the day prior
to the release of news. I find no evidence of increased return predictability around the news for
dark pool short sales in Panel B, which is consistent with the notion that dark pool trading is less
informed. Furthermore there is no increase in 20 day return predictability on news release days.
The 20 day return predictability of trading venue short sales does not increase on news days. This
result contrasts with that of Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg (2012). A potential explanation for
this result is the growth in news-based high frequency trading and improvements in news analytics
technology (for example, Keim, Massa, and von Beschwitz, 2013 shows that the introduction of
more advanced news analytics results in faster stock price reaction to news releases). These results
suggest that asymmetric information does not persist after news releases in my sample.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
In this study, I examine trading in 24 dark pools. To the extent that the results of this paper
are representative, they suggest that dark pools host a different composition of investors than
exchanges and in turn, induce a degree of order flow segmentation. Consistent with the mechanism
of Zhu (2014), as relatively more informed trade is executed on exchanges and relatively more
uninformed trade is executed in dark pools, there may be less noise accompanying informed supply
and demand on exchanges. This may result in increased price efficiency of markets with regard
to information acquired, though this may result in lower liquidity on exchange as there is more
information asymmetry in the remaining exchange order flow. The approach of this study focuses
on short sellers and does not examine other potential sources of informed trade such as long-only
investors with potentially longer lived information. Inferences could be different if long-only
investors are both informed and disproportionately use dark pools for their informed trading.1
However, some of the institutional investors literature has been rather skeptical of long investors’
information advantage (see Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997 and Lewellen, 2011).
Also, a comprehensive database of institutional investor trade level data does not exist, so any
analysis using this type of data may be subject to selection bias. By studying short sales, I am able
to construct a nearly comprehensive database of their position opening activity.
This study focuses on dark pools (formally known as Alternative Trading Systems) which
host slightly less than half of off-exchange trading in the sample. It is important to note that
off-exchange trading consists of more than dark pools. For example, off-exchange trading can
result from internalization and other types of transactions. Addressing all of the different types of
off-exchange trading is beyond the scope of this paper due to data limitations. However, Tuttle,
1In the appendix, I show that the share of trading done in dark pools sorts monotonically with institutional ownership
in my sample.
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2014, presents some useful facts regarding this issue. In the appendix I show that off-exchange
short sales in total comprise less of off-exchange trading volume and exhibit less return predictability
than the identified dark pool short sales I study. Although this paper focuses on the specific issue
of trading venue short sales, it raises questions regarding payment for order flow in off-exchange
trading. In some ways, the order flow segmentation of order flow that may be induced by dark pools
can be likened to the concept of “cream-skimming” as described in Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara
(1996), among others. Cream-skimming in this context refers to the concept of market participants
or venues purchasing uninformed order flow to trade against. This practice could ultimately affect
the liquidity of other venues as they are left with a greater amount of information asymmetry in
their remaining orders.
While strong statements about welfare are clearly beyond the scope of this empirical study;
dark pools may reduce transaction costs of the investors who use them. However, as dark pools
capture more order flow, exchanges may become less liquid, increasing transaction costs for the
investors who use exchanges. It’s not clear that the improvement in exchange market quality in
the absence of dark pools will offset the reduced transactions costs dark pool users may incur.
Consequently, eliminating dark pools may not be a pareto improvement. Welfare implications of
price informativeness are likely more nuanced as Stiglitz (2014) suggests. Ultimately, regulators
will have to weigh the impact of a regulation on market price efficiency against the impact of the
regulation on market liquidity and the price improvement enjoyed by users of dark pools.
While the segmentation of order flow in financial markets may improve the informational
efficiency of prices, in rational expectations models with endogenous and costly information acquisition,
markets instantaneously and at least partially convey information and the supply of informed
traders adjusts to provide sufficient compensation for information collection; see (Grossman and
Stiglitz, 1980 and Verrecchia, 1982, among others) The Grossman-Stiglitz (1980) Paradox suggests
that if markets instantaneously and fully convey information from the informed to the uninformed,
then there would not be sufficient compensation for anyone to obtain information. Since the market
would only convey only costless information, the market would be uninformative despite reflecting
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all the information that had been acquired.
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TABLES
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Stock level statistics Mean Median 1st Percentile 99th Percentile Standard Deviation
Novel news events per firm-day 0.060 0.044 0.010 0.277 0.090
Exchange short vol./Exchange vol. 0.457 0.481 0.182 0.617 0.099
Dark pool short vol./Dark pool vol. 0.370 0.372 0.123 0.587 0.101
Dark pool vol./Total vol. 0.131 0.138 0.025 0.234 0.046
Market capitalization ($ mm) $5,018 $721 $15 $77,943 $21,243
Panel B: News Categories N
Acquisitions and Mergers 4564
Analyst Ratings 12420
Assets 1683
Credit 1426
Credit Ratings 5405
Dividends 3060
Earnings 22834
Equity Actions 5814
Labor issues 6023
Partnerships 999
Products and Services 6765
The database has 1,343,458 stock-day observations over the period spanning August 2012
through June 2014 and contains 3,148 securities. Panel A provides summary statistics at the
stock level. I consider all related news releases in one day to be one news event. Novel news
events per stock-day is a count of news events per stock-day for a given stock. Exchange short
vol./Exchange vol. is exchange short sale volume divided by exchange trading volume for
a given stock over the sample. Dark pool short vol./Dark pool vol. is dark pool short sale
volume divided by dark pool trading volume for a given stock over the sample. Dark Pool
vol./Total vol. is total dark pool volume divided by total trading volume for a given stock over
the sample. Market capitalization is a stock sample average calculated from CRSP. Panel B
contains summary statistics on the frequency of news events from each news category in the
sample.
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Table 5.2: Short Sales Portfolio Raw Returns and Carhart Alphas
Panel A: Raw Returns and Carhart Alphas by Venue Type
Exchange All Dark Pools Block Midpoint Non-Midpoint
Portfolio Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha
1 (least shorted) 2.429 0.764 2.123 0.412 1.710 0.027 1.985 0.239 2.122 0.420
(6.83) (4.34) (0.50) (2.07) (4.47)
2 1.919 0.223 1.681 -0.021 1.573 -0.109 1.750 0.044
(1.96) (-0.22) (-1.05) (0.55)
3 1.591 -0.089 1.688 -0.006 1.751 0.055 1.623 -0.067
(-1.12) (-0.12) (0.95) (-1.27)
4 1.644 -0.078 1.628 -0.099 1.641 -0.089 1.639 -0.088
(-1.29) (-1.62) (-1.45) (-1.52)
5 (most shorted) 1.640 -0.128 1.656 -0.122 1.578 -0.148 1.730 -0.050 1.659 -0.134
(-1.49) (-1.39) (-1.45) (-0.58) (-1.57)
Long-Short 0.789 0.891 0.467 0.534 0.132 0.175 0.254 0.288 0.463 0.554
(5.72) (4.28) (1.59) (2.01) (4.45)
Spread with Exchange Long-Short 0.322 0.357 0.658 0.716 0.535 0.603 0.326 0.338
(2.85) (4.18) (4.13) (2.56)
Panel B: Long-Short Carhart Alphas by Venue Type over Different Holding Horizons
Exchange All Dark Pools Block Midpoint Non-Midpoint
Horizon Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat Alpha t-stat
10 1.153 (6.77) 0.701 (5.20) 0.118 (0.90) 0.382 (2.45) 0.815 (6.06)
20 0.891 (5.72) 0.534 (4.28) 0.175 (1.59) 0.288 (2.01) 0.554 (4.45)
40 0.784 (5.82) 0.554 (5.26) 0.045 (0.47) 0.261 (2.03) 0.578 (5.47)
60 0.606 (4.69) 0.428 (4.30) −0.074 (−0.79) 0.157 (1.20) 0.419 (4.26)
This table presents portfolio raw returns and Carhart (1997) alphas from regressions that examine the performance of value-weighted
portfolios based on short sales measures over the period spanning August 2012 through June 2014. Results are presented for portfolios
formed on the ratio of exchange short volume to exchange volume, total dark pool short volume to total dark pool volume, Block Dark
Pool short volume to Block Dark Pool Volume, Midpoint Dark Pool Short Volume to Midpoint Dark Pool Volume, and Non-Midpoint
Dark Pool short volume to non-Midpoint Dark Pool volume. After forming portfolios, value-weighted portfolios are held for the
following 20 trading days. This process is repeated each trading day, so that each trading day’s portfolio return is an average of
20 different portfolios, with 1/20 of the portfolio rebalanced each day. Panel presents long-short portfolio alphas for portfolios with
holding horizons of 10, 20, 40, and 60 days. Daily calendar-time returns and Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas are reported in percent
multiplied by 20 to reflect an approximately monthly return, with t-statistics based on the daily time series presented in parentheses.
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Table 5.3: Cross-sectional Relation Between Returns and Short Sales
Panel A: Exchange Short Sales
Raw Returns Adjusted Returns
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Intercept 2.113 2.113 0.119 0.120
(3.92) (3.92) (2.18) (2.20)
ExShortV ol
ExV ol
−1.518 −1.226 −1.294 −1.151
(−4.02) (−2.95) (−3.10) (−3.42)
Size −0.057 −0.031
(−0.63) (−1.05)
Book to Market 0.274 −0.013
(1.09) (−0.08)
Panel B: Dark Pool Short Sales
Raw Returns Adjusted Returns
[1] [2] [4] [5]
Intercept 2.112 2.113 0.119 0.121
(3.92) (3.92) (2.20) (2.22)
DPShortV ol
DPV ol
−0.821 −0.683 −0.735 −0.676
(−6.98) (−5.84) (−6.03) (−6.64)
Size −0.085 −0.057
(−0.99) (−1.62)
Book to Market 0.282 −0.006
(1.12) (−0.04)
Panel C: By Venue Type
Intercept Exchange Midpoint Non-Midpoint Size Book to Market
1.524 −1.100 −0.061 −0.031
(3.36) (−4.36) (−2.28) (−0.17)
1.694 −0.371 −0.098 −0.033
(3.69) (−5.65) (−3.53) (−0.19)
1.834 −0.765 −0.093 −0.034
(3.95) (−6.37) (−3.39) (−0.19)
1.726 −0.765 −0.077 −0.514 −0.067 −0.035
(3.76) (−2.86) (−1.46) (−4.17) (−2.45) (−0.20)
This table presents results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions examining the relation between
returns, short sales by type of trading venue over the period spanning August 2012 through June 2014.
For each model, I estimate 452 daily cross-sectional regressions and calculate the time series mean of
the daily coefficient estimates, and obtain t-statistics using Newey-West (1987) standard errors with 20
lags. Dependent variables are the cumulative raw returns or Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers
(1997) adjusted returns over the following 20 trading days. In panels A and B, each column corresponds
to a different specification. ExShortV olExV ol is the ratio of short sales volume executed on exchanges to total
trading volume executed on exchanges for a given stock-day. DPShortV olDPV ol is the ratio of total dark pool
short sales volume to dark pool trading volume for a given stock-day. In Panel C, raw returns are used,
dark pools are disaggregated into Midpoint and Non-Midpoint Dark Pools, and each row corresponds
to a separate specification. Size (the natural log of stock market capitalization) and Book-to-Market are
calculated as in Fama and French (1993). Explanatory variables are standardized to have a mean of zero
each day. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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Table 5.4: Post-Short Sale Midquote Cumulative Returns
5 Minutes 30 Minutes 2 Hours 1 Trading Day
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Panel A: All Dark Pools
Intercept 0.433∗∗∗ 0.373 −0.515 −3.863∗∗∗
Dark Pool −0.027 −0.007 0.274∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.712∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 1.378∗∗∗ 1.501∗∗∗
Panel B: By Dark Pool Type
Intercept 0.433∗∗∗ 0.373 −0.515 −3.863∗∗∗
Midpoint −0.023 0.013 0.372∗ 0.410∗∗ 1.261∗∗∗ 1.290∗∗∗ 2.865∗∗∗ 2.585∗∗∗
Non-Midpoint −0.017 −0.009 0.261∗ 0.300∗ 0.560∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.980∗∗∗ 1.217∗∗∗
This table presents interval-level regression estimates, for which the dependent variable is the midquote post-trade excess cumulative log returns
measured in basis points over various post-trade horizons. Trades are aggregated into five minute intervals and weighted by dollar volume. Dark
Pool, Midpoint and Non-Midpoint are indicator variables that take the value of one for all Dark Pool short sales, Midpoint Dark Pool short sales, and
Non-Midpoint Dark Pool short sales, respectively (the base case is Exchange short sales). Log returns are de-meaned. Standard errors are clustered
by five minute intervals. Model 1 does not include fixed effects and Model 2 includes stock fixed effects.∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance
for a coefficient estimate at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. This sample is a stratified sample of 439 stocks during September 2012
through June 2014.
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Table 5.5: Regression Analysis of Dark Pool-Volume Ratio Surrounding News Events
Event time of the dependent variable
Panel A: DPV ol
V ol
: Full Panel t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
Panel A1: All News
Log Spread 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
VIX −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
News Event 0.047 0.221∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
N 1,302,517 1,302,517 1,302,517 1,302,517 1,302,517
R2 27% 27% 27% 27% 27%
Panel A2: Scheduled News
News Event 0.029 0.358∗∗∗ 0.936∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
Panel A3: Unscheduled News
News Event 0.08 0.037 0.083 0.067 0.012
Panel B: DPV ol
V ol
: S&P 500 Stocks t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
Panel B1: All News
Log Spread −0.195∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗ −0.194∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗
VIX −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
News Event 0.218∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.878∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗ 0.139
N 184,092 184,092 184,092 184,092 184,092
R2 28% 28% 28% 28% 28%
Panel B2: Scheduled News
News Event 0.554∗∗∗ 1.187∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.108
Panel B3: Unscheduled News
News Event 0.027 0.093 0.298∗∗∗ 0.079 0.15
This table presents results of panel data regressions that examine dark pool volume surrounding
news events over the period spanning August 2012 through June 2014. In each regression in
Panel A, the dependent variable is daily stock dark pool trading volume divided by total daily
volume (in percent) and the independent variable of interest is an indicator variable that takes
the value of one if a news story occurs and zero otherwise. Panel A1 presents results for all
news events, Panel A2 presents results for scheduled news events, and Panel A3 presents results
for unscheduled news events. In Panels B results for S&P 500 stocks are presented. In each
panel I examine five separate regressions that vary the timing of the dependent variable relative
to the news event to examine short volume changes around news event. For example, t − 2
indicates that the news release indicator variable is equal to one two days before a news event.
All regressions include stock and month fixed effects and daily time-weighted log percentage
quoted spreads, and the log return of the VIX. Coefficients of interest are presented for some
specifications. ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance for a coefficient estimate at the 1,
5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5.6: Venue Short Sales Surrounding News Events
Event time of the dependent variable
Panel A: All t− 2 t− 1 t
Panel A1: All
Returnt−1 0.307∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
Returnt−2 0.126∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
Exchange 4.352∗∗∗ 4.356∗∗∗ 4.347∗∗∗
News −0.477∗∗∗ 0.244 −0.881∗∗∗
Exchange × News 0.513∗∗ 0.296 0.787∗∗∗
N 2,538,884 2,538,884 2,538,884
R2 21% 21% 21%
Panel A2: Negative
Exchange 4.358∗∗∗ 4.361∗∗∗ 4.356∗∗∗
News −0.577∗∗ 0.807∗∗∗ −2.423∗∗∗
Exchange × News 0.498 0.008 0.923∗∗
Panel B: Scheduled t− 2 t− 1 t
Panel B1: All
Exchange 4.361∗∗∗ 4.366∗∗∗ 4.360∗∗∗
News −0.261 0.883 −0.669∗∗∗
Exchange × News −0.011 −0.532 0.106
Panel B2: Negative
Exchange 4.361∗∗∗ 4.364∗∗∗ 4.360∗∗∗
News −0.514 1.318∗∗∗ −1.919∗∗∗
Exchange × News 0.083 −0.859∗ 0.041
Panel C: Unscheduled t− 2 t− 1 t
Panel C1: All
Exchange 4.352∗∗∗ 4.351∗∗∗ 4.348∗∗∗
News −0.761∗∗∗ −0.556∗∗ −1.110∗∗∗
Exchange × News 1.181∗∗∗ 1.358∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗
Panel C2: Negative
Exchange 4.358∗∗∗ 4.358∗∗∗ 4.356∗∗∗
News −0.716 −0.122 −3.376∗∗∗
Exchange × News 1.315∗∗ 1.636∗∗ 2.630∗∗∗
This table presents results of panel data regressions that examine trading venue short sales leading up
to and including news events over the period spanning August 2012 through June 2014. Each subpanel
corresponds to a separate regression. In each regression, the dependent variable is daily stock trading
venue short sale volume divided by total daily venue volume (in percent) and the independent variables
of interest are an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a news story occurs and zero otherwise
(News), another indicator variable that equals one if exchange trading is being considered (Exchange),
making dark pool trading the base case, and the interaction term of “News” and “Exchange”. Panel A
presents results for all news events, Panel B presents results for scheduled news events, and Panel C
presents results for unscheduled news events. I define a news event as positive (negative) if the news
announcement day return is in the top (bottom) quintile of return for that day, respectively. In each panel
I examine three separate regressions that vary the timing of the dependent variable relative to the news
event to examine short volume changes around news event. For example, t− 2 indicates that the news
release indicator variable is equal to one two days before a news event. All regressions include stock
and month fixed effects. I only present coefficients of interest in some panels. ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ indicate
statistical significance for a coefficient estimate at the 1,5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table 5.7: Cross-sectional Relation Between Returns, Short Sales, and News
Raw Returns Adjusted Returns
Panel A: Exchange Short Sales [1] [2] [3] [4]
Intercept 2.111 2.110 0.117 0.117
(3.92) (3.91) (2.16) (2.17)
ExShortV ol
ExV ol
−1.498 −1.206 −1.274 −1.130
(−3.90) (−2.87) (−3.02) (−3.31)
Newst−1 0.063 0.085 0.102 0.103
(0.62) (0.87) (1.11) (1.10)
ExShortV ol
ExV ol
×Newst−1 −1.269 −1.408 −1.395 −1.466
(−1.85) (−2.06) (−1.99) (−2.13)
Newst −0.182 −0.158 −0.153 −0.150
(−1.57) (−1.40) (−1.26) (−1.23)
ExShortV ol
ExV ol
×Newst −0.298 −0.181 0.043 0.068
(−0.45) (−0.27) (0.06) (0.09)
Size −0.057 −0.031
(−0.63) (−1.05)
Book to Market 0.273 −0.015
(1.08) (−0.09)
Raw Returns Adjusted Returns
Panel A: Dark Pool Short Sales [1] [2] [3] [4]
Intercept 2.110 2.111 0.117 0.119
(3.92) (3.91) (2.18) (2.19)
DPShortV ol
DPV ol
−0.815 −0.679 −0.730 −0.672
(−6.83) (−5.68) (−5.94) (−6.53)
Newst−1 0.059 0.077 0.105 0.107
(0.58) (0.77) (1.13) (1.13)
DPShortV ol
DPV ol
×Newst−1 0.245 0.161 0.228 0.148
(0.72) (0.49) (0.62) (0.41)
Newst −0.204 −0.180 −0.153 −0.144
(−1.75) (−1.61) (−1.42) (−1.35)
DPShortV ol
DPV ol
×Newst −0.119 0.014 −0.123 −0.065
(−0.34) (0.04) (−0.33) (−0.18)
Size −0.085 −0.057
(−0.99) (−1.62)
Book to Market 0.281 −0.008
(1.11) (−0.05)
This table presents results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions examining the relation between
returns, short sales by type of trading venue, and news events over the period spanning August 2012
through June 2014. For each model, I estimate 452 daily cross-sectional regressions and calculate the
time series mean of the daily coefficient estimates, obtain t-statistics using Newey-West (1987) standard
errors with 20 lags. Dependent variables are the cumulative raw returns or Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997) adjusted returns over the following 20 trading days. ExShortV olExV ol is the ratio of
short sales volume executed on exchanges to total trading volume executed on exchanges for a given
stock-day. DPShortV olDPV ol is the ratio of total dark pool short sales volume to dark pool trading volume
for a given firm-day. Newst−1 and Newst are indicator variables that equal one if there is a corporate
news release for a given firm on the following and current day, respectively. Size (the natural log of firm
market capitalization) and Book-to-Market are calculated as in Fama and French (1993). Explanatory
variables are standardized to have a mean of zero each day. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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FIGURES
Figure 6.1: Aggregate Dark Pool and Short Sales Share of Trading Volume
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Time series of shares of various types of aggregate trading volume across all stocks in the 3,148
stock sample over a sample period spanning August 2012 through June 2014. Exchange Short
vol./Exchange vol. is total daily exchange short sale volume divided by total daily exchange
trading volume across all firms in the sample. Dark Pool vol./Total vol. is total daily dark pool
volume divided by total daily trading volume across all firms in the sample. Dark Pool short
vol./Total Short vol. is total daily dark pool short sale volume divided by total daily short sale
volume across all firms in the sample. Dark Pool short vol./Dark pool vol. is total daily dark
pool short sale volume divided by total daily dark pool trading volume across all firms in the
sample.
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Figure 6.2: Average Cumulative Midquote Excess Returns after Venue Short Sales
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This figure presents average cumulative log returns (in basis points) after exchange (grey dashed line) and dark pool (black dashed line) short sales,
respectively. Log-returns are excess returns (de-meaned) and trades are aggregated into five minute intervals and dollar weighted. This sample
consists trading for a stratified sample of 439 stocks over September 2012 through June 2014. The horizontal axis is the number of five-minute
intervals after a short sale took place and the vertical axis is the cumulative log return of the short sales.
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Figure 6.3: Cumulative Return Response to Venue Short Sale Shocks
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This figure presents the equally weighted cumulative impulse response functions estimated from a vector autoregression of excess stock midquote
returns (in basis points) to exchange short sale (grey solid line) and dark pool short sale (black dashed line) shocks, respectively. Log-returns are
excess returns (de-meaned) and short sales are measured in dollar volume and aggregated into five minute intervals. The horizontal axis measures
the number of five-minute intervals after a short sale shock. The left vertical axis measures cumulative return responses after exchange short sale
shocks and the right vertical axis measures corresponding returns after dark pool short sale shocks. The magnitude of each short sale shock is equal
to the standard deviation of unanticipated exchange short sale dollar volume. This sample consists trading for a stratified sample of 439 stocks over
September 2012 through June 2014.
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Figure 6.4: Cumulative Returns conditioning on Short Sales and News
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This figure presents cumulative percentage returns from quintile long/short portfolios formed by conditioning on venue short sales or
venue short sales and news events being imminent the following day. These equal-weighted portfolios are then held for 20 days and
portfolio formation process is repeated each day.
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APPENDIX A: ROBUSTNESS STATISTICS
Table A.1: Incremental Unsigned Stock Returns on News Days
All News Unscheduled News Scheduled News
0.0037 0.0035 0.0038
(33.77) (20.62) (26.55)
This table presents results of the following regression: |Ri,t| = αi + αm + β1Newst + i,t.
This regression estimates the incremental unsigned stock returns on day of news events with
stock and month fixed effects. T-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Descriptive Sorts for Variables of Interest
Panel A: Short Sales
Average Trade/Cancel Ratio Average Short Interest Ratio
% Volume Sold Short
1 (Least Shorted) 4.07% 1.34%
2 4.62% 3.19%
3 4.62% 4.45%
4 4.58% 5.51%
5 (Most Shorted) 4.45% 6.95%
Panel B: Dark Pool Trading
Average Market Capitalization Average Institutional Ownership
% Total Volume Traded in Dark Pools
1 (Least Dark Pool Trading) $436.44 24.93%
2 $4,673.50 54.31%
3 $9,576.70 68.69%
4 $8,572.44 74.46%
5 (Most Dark Pool Trading) $3,962.43 76.09%
This table presents descriptive sorts for variables of interest. Panel A presents descriptive sorts for
short sales. First, stocks are sorted into quintiles on stock-day percentages of trading volume sold
sort and average stock-day trade to cancel ratios are calculated for each short sale quintile. Stock-day
trade to cancel ratios are obtained from the Securities Exchange Commission’s Market Information Data
Analytics System (MIDAS). Next, stocks are sorted into quintiles on stock-month percentages of trading
volume sold short and average stock-month ratios of short interest to shares outstanding are computed
for each quintile. Short interest data are obtained from NASDAQ and Compustat. Panel B presents
descriptive sorts for dark pool trading. First, stocks are sorted into quintiles on stock-day percentages
of trading volume in dark pools and average stock-day market capitalizations (in $mm ) are calculated
for each dark pool quintile. Next, stocks are sorted into quintiles on stock-quarter percentages of trading
volume in dark pools and average stock-quarter instiutional ownership percentages are computed
for each quintile. Institutional ownership data are obtained from the Thomson-Reuters Institutional
Holdings (13F) Database.
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Table A.3: Short Sales Surrounding News: Sentiment Scores Signing
Event time of the dependent variable
Panel A: All t− 2 t− 1 t
Panel A1: All
Returnt−1 0.307∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
Returnt−2 0.126∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
Exchange 4.352∗∗∗ 4.356∗∗∗ 4.347∗∗∗
News −0.477∗∗∗ 0.244 −0.881∗∗∗
Exchange × News 0.513∗∗ 0.296 0.787∗∗∗
N 2,538,884 2,538,884 2,538,884
R2 21% 21% 21%
Panel A2: Negative
Exchange 4.359∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗ 4.359∗∗∗
News −0.251 0.386 −0.647∗∗
Exchange × News 0.403 0.303 0.304
Panel B: Scheduled t− 2 t− 1 t
Panel B1: All
Exchange 4.361∗∗∗ 4.366∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗
News −0.261 0.883 −0.669∗∗∗
Exchange × News −0.011 −0.532 0.106
Panel B2: Negative
Exchange 4.363∗∗∗ 4.364∗∗∗ 4.363∗∗∗
News 0.725∗ 1.573∗∗∗ −0.208
Exchange × News −0.778 −1.18∗∗ −0.912
Panel C: Unscheduled t− 2 t− 1 t
Panel C1: All
Exchange 4.352∗∗∗ 4.351∗∗∗ 4.348∗∗∗
News −0.761∗∗∗ −0.556∗∗ −1.11∗∗∗
Exchange × News 1.181∗∗∗ 1.358∗∗∗ 1.671∗∗∗
Panel C2: Negative
Exchange 4.357∗∗∗ 4.357∗∗∗ 4.357∗∗∗
News −1.31∗∗∗ −0.957∗∗ −1.164∗∗∗
Exchange × News 1.675∗∗∗ 1.969∗∗∗ 1.707∗∗∗
This table presents results of panel data regressions that examine trading venue short sales leading up
to and including news events over the period spanning August 2012 through June 2014. Each subpanel
correspond to a separate regression. In each regression, the dependent variable is daily stock trading
venue short sale volume divided by total daily venue volume (in percent) and the independent variables
of interest are an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a news story occurs and zero otherwise
(News), another indicator variable that equals one if exchange trading is being considered (Exchange),
making dark pool trading the base case, and the interaction term of “News” and “Exchange”. Panel
A presents results for all news events, Panel B presents results for scheduled news events, and Panel
C presents results for unscheduled news events. I define a news event as positive (negative) if the
Ravenpack Sentiment Score is in the top (bottom) quintile of return for that day, respectively. In each
panel I examine three separate regressions that vary the timing of the dependent variable relative to the
news event to examine short volume changes around news event. For example, t− 2 indicates that the
news release indicator variable is equal to one two days before a news event. All regressions include
stock and month fixed effects. Since estimates for control variables,R2, and the number of observations
do not vary much across specifications, I only report them in Panel A1. ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical
significance for a coefficient estimate at the 1,5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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Table A.4: Dark Pool-Volume Ratio Surrounding News Events: Sentiment Score Signing
Event time of the dependent variable
Panel A: DPV ol
V ol
t− 2 t− 1 t t + 1 t + 2
Panel A1: All News
VIXt−1 −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗
News Event 0.04 0.216∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗
N 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325
R2 27% 27% 27% 27% 27%
Panel A2: Positive News
VIXt−1 −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
News Event −0.045 0.393∗∗ 0.381∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.059
N 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325
R2 27% 27% 27% 27% 27%
Panel A3: Negative News
VIXt−1 −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗
News Event 0.047 0.206∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.196
N 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325 1,315,325
R2 27% 27% 27% 27% 27%
Panel B: Scheduled t− 2 t− 1 t t + 1 t + 2
Panel B1: All 0.018 0.347∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗
Panel B2: Positive 0.379 0.87∗∗∗ 1.472∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.519∗
Panel B3: Negative −0.15 0.324∗ 0.805∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗
Panel C: Unscheduled
Panel C1: All 0.078 0.041 0.083 0.072 0.011
Panel C2: Positive −0.197 0.211 −0.103 0.018 −0.16
Panel C3: Negative 0.275 0.06 0.268 −0.116 −0.017
This table presents results of panel data regressions that examine dark pool volume surrounding news events over the period spanning August 2012
through June 2014. In each regression in Panel A, the dependent variable is daily stock dark pool trading volume divided by total daily volume (in
percent) and the independent variable of interest is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if a news story occurs and zero otherwise. Panel
A1 presents results for all news events, Panel A2 presents results for positive news events, and Panel A3 presents results for negative news events. In
Panels B and C, news events are separated into scheduled and unscheduled events, respectively and coefficients of interest are presented. I define a
news event as positive (negative) if the Ravenpack Sentiment Score is in the top (bottom) quintile of return for that day, respectively. In each panel I
examine five separate regressions that vary the timing of the dependent variable relative to the news event to examine short volume changes around
news event. For example, t−2 indicates that the news release indicator variable is equal to one two days before a news event. All regressions include
stock and month fixed effects and the lagged VIX close. ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance for a coefficient estimate at the 1,5, and 10
percent level, respectively.
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Figure A.1: ATS Classification Statistics
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This figure presents ATS categories superimposed (as shaded areas) over all individual ATSs based on their average trade size (vertical axis) and
percentage of trades inside the NBBO (horizontal axis). This figure comes from a merged sample of the TRF and OATS. This sample spans August
2012 through June 2014 trading for 22 ATSs.
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Table A.5: Alternative Market Design Short Sale Portfolios
Exchange Non-Scheduled Cross Non-Poolclub Non-IOI/Display Non-VWAP All Off-Exchange
Portfolio Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha
1 (least shorted) 2.429 0.764 2.135 0.420 1.934 0.132 2.093 0.397 2.144 0.433 2.100 0.416
(6.83) (4.39) (1.30) (4.36) (4.45) (4.29)
2 1.919 0.223 1.747 0.045 1.693 -0.055 1.803 0.097 1.666 -0.021 1.795 0.107
(1.96) (0.52) (-0.59) (1.34) (-0.22) (1.41)
3 1.591 -0.089 1.671 -0.027 1.536 -0.168 1.620 -0.085 1.667 -0.027 1.639 -0.070
(-1.12) (-0.47) (-2.23) (-1.48) (-0.50) (-1.09)
4 1.644 -0.078 1.597 -0.120 1.644 -0.008 1.597 -0.121 1.643 -0.087 1.617 -0.104
(-1.29) (-2.00) (-0.12) (-2.20) (-1.44) (-1.67)
5 (most shorted) 1.640 -0.128 1.672 -0.113 1.785 0.054 1.682 -0.092 1.681 -0.110 1.708 -0.052
(-1.49) (-1.33) (0.44) (-1.14) (-1.31) (-0.60)
Long-Short 0.789 0.891 0.463 0.533 0.101 0.089 0.411 0.490 0.463 0.544 0.392 0.468
(5.72) (4.23) (0.82) (4.13) (4.33) (3.99)
Spread with Exchange Long-Short 0.326 0.358 0.688 0.746 0.378 0.401 0.326 0.347 0.397 0.423
(2.87) (4.13) (2.86) (2.75) (3.32)
Percentage of Total Volume 12.40% 0.31% 4.75% 10.82% 34.72%
Percentage of Venue Type Volume Sold Short 45.88% 41.51% 50.12% 45.17% 40.24%
This table presents portfolio raw returns and Carhart (1997) alphas from regressions that examine the performance of value-weighted portfolios
based on short sales measures over the period spanning August 2012 through June 2014. Results are presented for portfolios formed on the ratio of
exchange short volume to exchange volume, total non-scheduled crossing dark pool short volume to total non-scheduled crossing dark pool volume,
non-pool club dark pool short volume to non-pool club volume, non-Indication of Interest (IOI)/Order displaying dark pools, non-volume weighted
average pricing (VWAP) dark pools, and for all non-ADF off-exchange trading. After forming portfolios, value-weighted portfolios are held for
the following 20 trading days. This process is repeated each trading day, so that each trading day’s portfolio return is an average of 20 different
portfolios, with 1/20 of the portfolio rebalanced each day. Daily calendar-time returns and Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas are reported in percent
multiplied by 20 to reflect an approximately monthly return, with t-statistics based on the daily time series presented in parentheses.
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Table A.6: Short Sale Portfolio Equal-Weighted Raw Returns and Alphas
Exchange All Dark Pools Block Midpoint Non-Midpoint
Portfolio Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha Raw Return Alpha
1 (least shorted) 2.924 1.651 2.730 1.110 2.246 0.313 2.627 0.866 2.682 1.034
(10.49) (9.09) (3.58) (6.69) (8.53)
2 2.328 0.472 2.361 0.451 2.351 0.401 2.349 0.428
(5.64) (6.43) (5.72) (6.35)
3 2.098 0.165 2.166 0.199 2.187 0.190 2.163 0.204
(2.53) (2.94) (2.36) (3.13)
4 2.046 0.062 2.084 0.091 2.082 0.058 2.075 0.073
(0.93) (1.21) (0.68) (0.98)
5 (most shorted) 2.118 0.177 2.088 0.216 1.959 -0.003 2.090 0.164 2.108 0.227
(1.99) (2.41) (-0.02) (2.10) (2.37)
Long-Short 0.807 1.475 0.642 0.894 0.287 0.316 0.536 0.703 0.575 0.807
(9.21) (8.62) (3.18) (6.55) (7.93)
Spread with Exchange Long-Short 0.165 0.581 0.519 1.159 0.270 0.772 0.232 0.668
(4.98) (6.69) (6.36) (5.46)
This table presents portfolio raw returns and Carhart (1997) alphas from regressions that examine the performance of equal-weighted
portfolios based on short sales measures over the period spanning August 2012 through June 2014. Results are presented for portfolios
formed on the ratio of exchange short volume to exchange volume, total dark pool short volume to total dark pool volume, Block Dark
Pool short volume to Block Dark Pool Volume, Midpoint Dark Pool Short Volume to Midpoint Dark Pool Volume, and Non-Midpoint
Dark Pool short volume to Non-Midpoint Dark Pool volume. After forming portfolios, equal-weighted portfolios are held for the
following 20 trading days. This process is repeated each trading day, so that each trading day’s portfolio return is an average of 20
different portfolios, with 1/20 of the portfolio rebalanced each day. Daily calendar-time returns and Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas
are reported in percent multiplied by 20 to reflect an approximately monthly return, with t-statistics based on the daily time series
presented in parentheses.
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Figure A.2: Cumulative Percentage Returns of Venue Short Sale Long-Short Portfolios
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This figure presents cumulative percentage returns of exchange short sale (grey line and dark pool short sale (black line) value weighted
long-short portfolios. The sample spans August 2012 through June 2014.
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Table A.7: Stratified Tickers Used for Intraday Analyses
AAPL BRO DELL FSTR IRF MGRC OSG SGB TTO
ABCO BRS DGIT FTK ISCA MIDD OSIR SGMO TTWO
ACCO BSQR DGSE FTR ISIG MKTG OWW SHOO TUC
ACFC BTC DHI FVE ISIL MLAB PACW SHW TWMC
ACRX BTN DMND FXCM ISIS MLI PAR SJW TYL
ACU BWC DOLE GB ITC MLP PBH SKH UACL
ADBE BWLD DRAD GBDC ITT MN PDCO SKY UAM
ADNC BXC DRIV GCOM ITW MNTX PDO SLAB UHAL
AEGR BXG DST GERN JACK MOC PED SLTC UNP
AEO BZC DXR GHM JBLU MOCO PERY SMPL UNTY
AGEN CACI DY GIS JKHY MPO PETS SMTC URI
AI CAP DYAX GLYC JOE MPR PG SNA UUU
AIM CARV EA GROW JRN MRC PKI SNPS V
AKAM CASC EBAY GRPN JXSB MRLN PKOH SPA VALU
ALC CAW ECBE GSVC KATE MSCC PLFE SPR VICL
ALDX CBSH EFSC GTLS KDN MSL PLX SPWR VQ
ALTV CCBG EGAN GVP KEG MSN PNNT SRT VVI
AMBR CCUR ELRC GWRE KEX MSO POWL SRZ VVUS
AMED CECE ELY HAFC KFT MTH POWR SSFN WABC
AMSF CFI END HAIN KMG MTSI PRX STBZ WAL
AMZN CGI ENR HAS KRO MX PSTR STLD WAYN
ANEN CHCO ENZ HBI KTOS MXC PTEN SUSS WBCO
ANN CHRW EOG HCBK KWR MYGN QDEL SVT WGL
ANV CHS ERIE HCSG KYAK MYRG QLIK SWC WGO
AOL CHTR ESP HEOP LABL NAII QSII SYMC WHG
APAM CMCO ESYS HI LADR NATR RBNF SYUT WLH
ARIA CORI ETFC HIBB LAMR NAVB RCAP TA WMB
ARNA CORT EV HKN LF NBIX RENT TAXI WNC
ASPN COTY EVC HLS LFUS NCFT RES TAYD WRLS
ASUR CPHD EVI HLYS LGND NFP RGR TBBK WSTC
ATW CQB EXAR HOLX LHCG NFSB RH TBI WTBA
AVP CR EXE HRB LMAT NKTR RLD TCI WVT
AWAY CRBC EXP HSIC LMNX NRIM RLGY TIF WWD
AWK CRDN FABK HSY LNDC NSP RMAX TISI XCRA
AZPN CROX FCSC HTWR LNN NU RMTI TITN XRM
BAGR CRV FET HURC LOCK NVEC ROK TJX YHOO
BAX CSCD FFBH HWBK LOW NVR ROP TLMR YUME
BBBY CSH FFIV ICH LSI NWN ROST TLYS Z
BBSI CSLT FFKT IDCC LVS NWY RUBI TNGO ZOES
BCO CTBI FIRE IFF LZB NXTM RVBD TNS
BGG CTCT FIVE IGT MANH NYLD SAL TOF
BHLB CTGX FIVN IMH MAR NYT SAPE TOWR
BKI CVCY FLL IMI MAT OCFC SASR TPCG
BKR CWEI FNP IMPV MBWM OGE SBUX TREX
BKW CYBX FORD INCY MC OME SCLN TRLA
BLMT CYNI FRAN INFA MCO ONB SCSS TRMK
BPZ DAR FRGI INGN MDVN ONNN SEIC TRR
BRCM DCI FRM IO MEAD ONVI SFBC TRUE
BRLI DCOM FRNK IPAS MFRM ORA SFM TTEK
BRN DECK FSS IRBT MFSF ORN SGA TTI
This table presents the list of the stratified sample of tickers used for the intraday analyses. The
stratified sample consists of 152 stocks from each size tercile, 76 being NYSE Group listed and 76
being NASDAQ listed. Several symbols are removed due to consistently spurious quotes, leaving 439
stocks.
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Figure A.3: Average Returns after Short Sales: Trade Weighting
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This figure presents average cumulative log returns (in basis points) after exchange (grey dashed line) and dark pool (black dahsed line) short sales,
respectively. Log-returns are excess returns (de-meaned) and trades are aggregated to five minute intervals and trade weighted.
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Figure A.4: Average Cumulative Midquote Excess Returns after Dark Pool Type Short Sales
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This figure presents average cumulative log returns (in basis points) after exchange (blue line), Block Dark Pool (red line), Midpoint Dark Pool (green
line), and Non-Midpoint Dark Pool (purple line) short sales, respectively. Log-returns are excess returns (de-meaned) and trades are aggregated to
five minute intervals and dollar weighted.
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Table A.8: Cumulative Post Short Sale Returns: Trade Weighting
5 Minutes 30 Minutes 2 Hours 1 Trading Day
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Panel A: All Dark Pools
Intercept 0.255∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ −0.018 −2.005∗∗∗
Dark Pool 0.224∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗ 1.331∗∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗
Panel B: By Dark Pool Type
Intercept 0.255∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ −0.018 −2.005∗∗∗
Midpoint 0.171∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.449 1.083∗∗∗
Non-Midpoint 0.243∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗ 1.668∗∗∗ 2.263∗∗∗
This table presents interval-level regression estimates, for which the dependent variable is the cumulative midquote excess returns measured in basis
points over various post-trade horizons. Trades are aggregated to five-minute intervals and are weighted by the number of trades. Dark Pool, Midpoint
and Non-Midpoint are indicator variables that take the value of one for all Dark Pool short sales, Midpoint Dark Pool short sales, and Non-Midpoint
Dark Pool short sales, respectively (the base case is Exchange short sales). Midquote log returns are excess returns (de-meaned). Model 1 does not
include fixed effects and Model 2 includes stock fixed effects.∗∗∗,∗∗ , and ∗ indicate statistical significance for a coefficient estimate at the 1,5, and
10 percent level, respectively. This sample is a stratified sample of 439 stocks during September 2012 through June 2014.
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Table A.9: Trading Venue Daily Short Sale Volume-Weighted Average Price
Panel A: Dollar Volume Weighted Panel B: Equal Weighted
Incremental Dark Pool VWAP 0.008 Incremental Dark Pool VWAP -0.144
(0.83) (-0.98)
This table presents results for the following regression: VWAPi,t = αi,t + 1DP + i,t. Stock-day Volume weighted
average prices are the dependent variable and regressed on stock-day fixed effects, and an indicator variable that
equals one for dark pool VWAPs (making exchange VWAPs the base case). Panel A weighs observations by dollar
volume and Panel B weighs observations equally. This sample comprises trading during December 2012 through
June 2014.
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Table A.10: Incremental Stock Trading Volume Surrounding News Events
Event time of the dependent variable
Panel A: All News t− 5 t− 4 t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5
-26634.02 -17585.32 -14872.60 9260.79 122472.11 715880.81 200377.67 82175.27 47511.71 16487.70 6055.79
(-1.91) (-1.26) (-1.06) (0.66) (8.80) (51.49) (14.38) (5.90) (3.41) (1.18) (0.44)
Panel B: Unscheduled News t− 5 t− 4 t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5
-66979.77 -40981.42 -50620.68 -30739.84 60157.21 565397.69 99490.70 -13774.93 -17438.55 -56621.23 -62866.41
(-3.11) (-1.90) (-2.35) (-1.43) (2.79) (26.27) (4.60) (-0.64) (-0.80) (-2.62) (-2.91)
Panel C: Scheduled News t− 5 t− 4 t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5
-17001.88 -18877.98 -7367.89 20445.88 151029.93 810854.20 254039.14 135378.59 74805.58 50722.57 37731.92
(-0.93) (-1.03) (-0.40) (1.12) (8.33) (44.72) (13.99) (7.47) (4.12) (2.80) (2.08)
This table presents results of the following regression: V oli,t = αi + αm + β11Newst−5 + β21Newst−4 + β31Newst−3 + β41Newst−2 +
β51Newst−1 +β61Newst +β71Newst+1 +β81Newst+2 +β91Newst+3 +β101Newst+4 +β111Newst+5 + i,t. This regression estimates the
incremental stock trading volume on the 11 days surrounding news events with stock and month fixed effects. Panel A presents results
for all news events, Panel B presents results for unscheduled news events, and Panel C Presents results for scheduled news events.
T-statistics are presented in parentheses.
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Figure A.5: Daily Relative Volume Around News Events
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This figure presents the value-weighted average of daily relative volume around news events during the period spanning August 2012 through June
2014. The figure displays daily exchange short volume, exchange volume, dark pool volume, and daily dark pool short volume for the five days
before and after news events. Volumes are scaled by their mean values over the period t-6 to t-10.
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Figure A.6: Cumulative Value Weighted Returns after Short Sales and News
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
8/15/2012 11/15/2012 2/15/2013 5/15/2013 8/15/2013 11/15/2013 2/15/2014 5/15/2014
C
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e 
R
et
u
rn
 
Date 
Exchange News
Dark Pool News
Exchange
Dark Pool
This figure presents cumulative returns from quintile long/short portfolios formed by conditioning on venue short sales or venue short sales and
news events being imminent the following day. These value-weighted portfolios are then held for 20 days and portfolio formation process process is
repeated each day.
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